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Transitional Russia from a Historical and Didactic Perspective



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Editorial Alois Ecker

This dual approach to history and history teaching is not just an anticipation of the new title of the journal – for the year 2001 we plan to change the name of the journal into "Beiträge zur historischen Sozialkunde *und Geschichtsdidaktik*" – it has a history of its own: The editorial board of our journal decided to produce several numbers which are dedicated to societies in transition all over the globe. As volume 2/2000 we have edited in German several articles on transformation

This special number of the journal of history "Beiträge zur historischen Sozialkunde" is dedicated to the development of history and history teaching in the Russian Federation. The reader may be astonished to find on the one hand three articles which see their main purpose in giving an overview about recent developments in Russian political and social development, and on the other hand articles on the didactics of history – which means: the selection and transformation of historical information into social and communicative competence.

> processes in the Russian Federation. We have taken three articles from this volume and translated them: Andreas Kappeler describes in a diachronic perspective the changes from the multinational Russian Empire and from centralist hierarchic organisation during the Soviet period to regionalisation and the building of the fifteen 'national' states, which form the Russian Federation since 1991. Hans-Georg Heinrich concentrates on interrelations between political, social and economic changes in Russia during the 1990ies and describes the background of current economic problems. Martina Ritter takes the concept of 'civil society' as focus for her reflections on social problems in today's Russian society; she describes deficits which result to a large extent from the Soviet time, but have reverberations in actual social politics.

The conception for this special edition was to give a multiperspective view on the histo-

ry of the RF. So we invited colleagues from Russia to write articles about the political, social and economic development during the last decade. Unfortunately, we did not get their contributions until today, so we have to postpone these plans for a next edition. But, partly, we succeeded in this multiperspective approach (for the second part).

The second part is dedicated to the analysis of recent developments in the didactics of history. The Council of Europe started a Programme of Activities relating to history and civic education in early 1996. A main focus for this programme was the reform of history teaching and the preparation of new history textbooks in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As a third focus questions of teacher training were discussed at various events.

The authors who contributed to the second part have worked together in the framework of conferences or seminars of these programmes: Alison Cardwell describes these activities in the Russian Federation and gives an overview of the results of the co-operation between the Council of Europe and the succession states of the former Soviet Union. The development from centralism in the educational system to pluralism and forms of democratisation is reflected in the following articles, which deal with curriculum development, textbook production and teacher training. Ludmila Alexashkina gives an overview of the development of history curricula for secondary education since the beginning of the 1990ies. Alexander Shevyrev critically comments on the new generation of history textbooks in contemporary Russia, Nina Hryashcheva and Ludmila Andrukhina discuss new theories and methods for the initial and in-service training of history teachers.

As far the didactic part, we can add two articles from a Western perspective. Joke van der Leeuw-Roord, Executive Director of EU-ROCLIO, the European Standing Conference of History Teachers' Associations, informs about a co-operation project in which experts from Russia, the Baltic States, Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands worked together in the production of a joint history textbook of Russia, Uroki Klio. And finally Alois Ecker gives some comments on the didactics of history in the Russian Federation from the point of view of process-oriented didactics of history.

The opinions expressed in the articles are

those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the line of 'Beiträge zur historischen Sozialkunde' or the editor's opinion.

Our special thanks to Marianne Oppel who carefully made the Layout.

The editor hopes to contribute with this volume to a deeper understanding of the processes of transformation, which Russia is undergoing in her current development; he also hopes to motivate other colleagues to initiate partnerships or to start other forms of co-operation between historians in their country and historians or history teachers in the Russian Federation. It is mainly by such forms of co-operation that we may learn to overcome the sometimes narrow stereotypes which exist in our countries as a legacy of nationalistic attitudes towards foreign cultures and histories.



Babushka and young soldiers watching a parade on Republic's day in Kazan, Tatarstan. (Compared to other regions of the Russian Federation the Republic of Tatarstan is relativly rich and thus developing since a long time autonomously within the Federation.) Foto: Dragoljub Zamurovic, in: Kazan. The Enchanted Capital, Flint River Press Ltd., London, 1995, p. 38

From the Multinational Soviet Empire to 15 National States

Unexpectedly, in the years from 1988 to 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and, what came even more unexpectedly, 15 new states whose borders are identical with those of the 15 former Soviet republics emerged from the ruins. At the same time Yugoslavia and, only fractionally later, Czechoslovakia also disintegrated into their federal components. Thus, at precisely the time when Western Europe set out to overcome the national states in the form of a united Europe the multinational socialist states of Eastern Europe dissolved into national states. This reverse trend makes it all the harder for us Western Europeans to understand and appreciate ethnic movements and national separatism in the east of Europe.

Until the end of the eighties within the Soviet Union and without the recognition prevailed that the issue of the different nationalities had been resolved, that the country's over one hundred ethnic groups were about to eventually merge and fuse into one, firmly Russian-dominated, Soviet people. The Soviet communists up until Mikhail Gorbatchev were convinced that with the establishment of socialism the breeding ground for national antagonisms had vanished and the age of internationalist friendship had dawned.

Since the end of 1991 the world is confronted with 15 new states that have filled the place of the Soviet superpower. Initially, one did not quite take these new states seriously in Russia or in the West, moreover, one reckoned on their reintegration. It was only very gradually that such thinking was revised. Historical studies and research work, too, began to assume a new, different, orientation. In the new states themselves and abroad one set about constructing national histories. Furthermore, attention was focused increasingly on the nationalities issue within the Soviet Union, which was now recognised and appraised as a multinational empire, and particularly on the formation of the Soviet republics that seven decades further on suddenly proved to be the vehicles of national independence.

I should like to address this question after a brief retrospective view of the multinational Tsarist Empire. Afterwards, the relevance of the national problem for the demise of the USSR shall be discussed. Eventually, various current problems within the 15 post-Soviet states will be broached.

The Tsarist multinational Empire In the course of her expansion to the east, south and west, reaching from the 16th to the 19th centuries, Russia became a multinational empire. After the 1897 national census the Russians, as Staatsvolk (literally, "national people"), merely comprised a share of 44 per cent of the overall population (see table 2). The Russian Empire presented a landscape of ethnic variety that was unique in Europe, containing over one hundred different languages, with representatives of the worldembracing religions of Christianity (in the orthodox, catholic, protestant and the Armenian variant), Islam, Judaism, Buddhism and of animistic confessions, displaying a coexistence of various ways of economic and private life, that of industrial workers, settled farmers, transhumant shepherds, mountain people, hunters and gatherers.

The Russian Empire has never been a national state up until the very end, and ethnic-national criteria did not play a prevailing role. The Tsarist government stood by a pre-national, dynastic and corporative imperial patriotism that was supposed to integrate the heterogeneous population. For centuries loyal non-Russian elites had been co-opted into the imperial aristocracy so as to control the peripheral areas with their help. The social and cultural status quo in the newly acquired territories was modified at a very slow pace only and the nonorthodox languages and confessions were tolerated.

With the modernisation initiated in the wake of the reforms of the eighteen sixties the Russian state increasingly strove for a systematisation and uniformity of both administrative and social conditions and cut down on the privileges enjoyed by the peripheral regions. At the same time national movements gradually gained ground and Russian society was also affected. This, in turn, was reflected in the Tsarist regime's chosen policy of dealing with the different nationalities within the state; from then on linguistic Russification was actively promoted with several ethnic groups in the west and the south. In the course of the 1905 revolution national movements swiped virtually all ethnic groups. Thus, the foundations had been laid which could be taken up in 1917.

The February revolution of 1917 again brought a massive wave of national and social mobilisation. When the Bolsheviks seized power in October of the same year the separatist movements gathered in strength. In 1918, Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan had seceded from Russia. The empire had, therefore, been reduced to the pan-Russian core. The parallels with the break-up of the Soviet Union are obvious. What had been put off at the beginning of the 20th century has now eventually been caught up on at its close.

The Formation of and Ethnic Particularism within the Soviet Union

In the civil war the Bolsheviks, who laid claim to the legacy of the multinational empire, succeeded in regaining most of the seceders (with the exception of Poland, Finland, the Baltic states and Bessarabia) by the use of force and making concessions. The question remained, however, as to how the multinational Soviet state ought to be organised.

Lenin had recognised very early on that the discontent of the various nationalities might considerably aid what revolutionary potential there was in Russia. He had included in the official Bolshevik party programme, therefore, the key phrase of the self-determination of all peoples, even the right of secession. After the events of October 1917 federalism was added as a new principle. Those territories that had seceded from Russia were to be won over again by the promise of the formation of a federation.

In 1918 already the new state was constituted as the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR). Within this RSFSR autonomous republics (ASSR) were set up in accordance with ethnic and linguistic criteria. Peripheral areas such as Ukraine were proclaimed as formally independent Soviet republics (SSR). The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (SSSR) consisted of the four original republics – the RSFSR, the Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Transcaucasian SSR - and was proclaimed in December 1922. By the year 1936 the five Central Asian republics had also been included and the Transcaucasian Republic was split into the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. As a direct result of the Hitler-Stalin-Pact the three Baltic States and Moldova were also incorporated as Soviet republics in 1940 (compare table 1 and the map). In the constitution, passed in 1924 and effectively confirmed twice, in 1936 and 1987, the federal character of the Soviet Union was firmly established. Ultimate power, however, lay with the centralistically organised Communist Party.

The Soviet nationalities policy in the twenties followed the course and the objectives set by Lenin and propagated the equality of all peoples within the Federation in order to eliminate the sources of national conflicts. On the one hand this was attempted by way of adopting a policy of indigenisation (korenisazija), i.e. filling leading positions in the national republics with regional cadres. This ploy was intended to integrate the nationalities through the co-optation of their Communist elites. On the other hand the national cultures were promoted and supported, they had to be "national in form and socialist in content". Throughout the Soviet Union native language schools were instituted, in 1935 lessons were held in as many as 80 different languages in the RSFSR. Furthermore, for 48 ethnic groups literary languages and scripts had to be developed in the first place. Thus, the Soviet communists con-

DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA PROCLAMATION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS (NOVEMBER 15, 1917)

The October Revolution commenced under the general banner of liberation from oppression.

The peasants are liberated from the dominion of their manor lords, for from now on manor lords do not possess landed property anymore – it is abolished. Soldiers and sailors are liberated from the command of autocratic generals, for from now on generals will be elected and may be dismissed. The workers are liberated from the whims and the tyranny of the capitalists, for from now on the workers assume control of the factories. All life is liberated from the hated fetters.

There shall only remain the peoples of Russia, which have endured and still endure oppression and wilfulness, whose deliverance is to begin at once, whose liberation has to be achieved, decisively and irrevocably.

In the era of Tsarism the peoples have been systematically stirred up against one another. The results of such a policy are infamous: massacres and pogroms on the one hand and oppression and enslavement on the other.

Such a disgraceful policy of hate campaigns will and must not be repeated. Instead, a policy must be heeded of a genuine federation of all peoples of Russia on their own accord ...

The Council of People's Commissars has decided to make the following principles the foundation of its activity with regard to the nationalities of Russia:

- 1.) Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.
- 2.) Right of the peoples of Russia of free self-determination, including the right of secession and the formation of a sovereign state.
- 3.) Abolition of all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions.
- 4.) Free development of national minorities and ethnographical groups that inhabit the territory of Russia

In the name of the Russian Republic:

- The Commissar for Nationalities (Stalin)
- The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Lenin)

structed new nations and decisively contributed to the consolidation of such less-than-stable nations as the Ukrainians or Kazakhs.

It is a fateful paradox that the world's first socialist state was also the first state whose territorial structure followed ethnic criteria. Complementary to the territorial principle the personal principle of cultural autonomy as proposed and proclaimed by Austromarxism and once combated by both Lenin and Stalin was also taken into account. In the thirties each one's ethnic origins, one's nationality, was even embodied as a hereditary mark of each Soviet citizen to be registered in the domestic passport. This is surprising all the more since the ethnic-national principle appears to hold certain contradictions to the internationalist credo of Communism. What were the reasons for this ethnic particularism in the Soviet Union?

First, this was a concession made to the national-separatist movements of the more advanced nations in the west and south so as to establish and consolidate Soviet power in the periphery. Second, ideological convictions also came into play: the national problem was considered a product of the class differences created by capitalism and was automatically resolved by surmounting these. As to accomplish the internationalist objective the most retrograde peoples of Russia had to pass through the stage of cultural nationalism, all national oppression had to be eradicated. Lenin was not the only one, however, to promote ethnic particularism, Stalin, who had made a political career for himself as a nationalities specialist, did so, too.

From the mid-thirties onwards, however, some of these concessions were withdrawn and the influence of the Russian language and the imperial core was reinforced. The newly mobilised non-Russian elites were almost entirely slain in the course of the *"Great Terror"*. The apex of natio-



Memorial near Ekaterinburg in commemoration of the victims who had been executed or died through repressions by Stalin in the period between 1930 and 1950.

Foto by Alois Ecker

ALMA ATA DECLARATION (DECEMBER, 21, 1991)

The independent states, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine, endeavouring to

nal repression was reached with

- build democratic states under the rule of law, among which relations shall develop on the basis of mutual recognition and respect for national sovereignty and sovereign equality,
- embody the inalienable right of self-determination, the principles of equality and non-intervention in internal affairs, the condemnation of the use and threat of force as well as economic and other forms of exerting pressure, ...
- in recognition and respect of the territorial integrity of each state and the inviolability of existing frontiers,
- in the belief that the consolidation of friendly relations, good neighbourliness and cooperation for mutual benefit, which have deep historical roots, conforms with the principal interest of the nations and promotes the cause of peace and security, ...

make the following declaration:

The cooperation of the member states of the Commonwealth shall follow the principle of equality with the aid of coordinative institutions that are formed on the basis of equal representation and operate under the rules, which the Commonwealth – itself neither a state nor a super-state construction – has agreed upon.

As to ensure stability and security in international relations the joint command over the military-strategic forces and singular control of nuclear arms will remain in force. The parties respect any particular decision to assume the status of a non-nuclear and (or) neutral state.

The Commonwealth of Independent States will by mutual agreement be kept open for states – members of the former Soviet Union as well as for other states – that share its objects and principles and wish to join the Commonwealth. This is to reaffirm the inviolable obligation of cooperation in the making and development of a common economic area as well as of European and Eurasian markets.

With the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics ceases to exist.

the deportation of Soviet-Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechnyans and other ethnic groups, all accused of collaboration with the German occupying forces, during World War II. Their autonomous territories were abolished and only partially restored in the late fifties. The framework of national republics and the precedence of the ethnic issue remained undisputed, however, even in the times of Stalinism.

The National Factor in the Breakdown of the Soviet Union

In the last centuries of the Soviet Union the concept "national in form, socialist in content" underwent several changes: the socialist component lost some of its attractions and the national form filled the resulting vacuum content-wise. The Soviet patriotism that was spurred on by Stalin and mingled with Russiannational ideas during World War II and eventually occupied the spot of the second ideology of integration next to Marxism-Leninism also added to this process.

On the other hand, industrialisation, urbanisation and the expansion and improvement of the educational system led to the formation of new national elites. Modernisation forced and accentuated government-supported tendencies of Russification as well as the "melting" of the nations into one "Soviet People". On the other hand, the wave of modernisation triggered another national mobilisation. From the sixties onwards a new indigenisation and national Communist movements could be detected in most of the republics. Moreover, activists of some of these peoples organised national movements that were by and large restricted to small groups of intellectuals with the exception of the Crimean Tatars and Lithuanians, whose movements attained mass character.

The decisive impulse for the breakup of the multinational Soviet Empire was not provided by the various national movements but by the core of the system itself. It was not until Gorbatchev's reforms, the collapse of the Communist Party and the weakening of central power that at the end of the eighties the national expansion was precipitated, which, subsequently, contributed substantially to the breakdown of the Soviet state. The Armenians when in mass demonstrations they demanded that Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian enclave on Azerbaijan territory, be incorporated into Armenia set the entire spectacle in motion in 1988. In the course of said year the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians initiated political emancipatory movements that strove for

DECLARATION OF SOVEREIGNTY OF THE RSFSR (JUNE, 12, 1990)

On the sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic as a state: The first Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR,

- in awareness of its historic responsibility for the fate of Russia,
- showing respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples that are part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
- expressing the will of the people of the RSFSR,

solemnly proclaims the sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on its entire territory and declares its determination to establish a democratic state under the rule of law within the association of the Union of SSR.

- 1.) The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic is a sovereign state that has been historically formed by the union of the peoples.
- 2.) The sovereignty of the RSFSR is a natural and necessary prerequisite for the existence of Russia as a state that has a centuries-old history, culture and tradition.
- 3.) Sovereignty is held by the multinational people, which is the source of state authority in the RSFSR. The people exercises state authority directly and through representative bodies on the basis of the constitution of the RSFSR.
- 5.) As to ensure political, economic and legal guarantees of the sovereignty of the RSFSR the following shall be declared: the absolute authority of the RSFSR with regard to the solution of all issues of public and social life, with the exception of those that are transmitted by the RSFSR on its own accord to the competence of the Union of SSR; the precedence of the constitution of the RSFSR and its laws on the entire territory of the RSFSR; actions taken by the Union of SSR that contradict the sovereign rights of the RSFSR will be repealed by the Republic on its territory; ...
- 11.) On the entire territory of the RSFSR the republican citizenship of the RSFSR is introduced. Each citizen of the RSFSR will keep the citizenship of the USSR.

The citizens of the RSFSR outside the frontiers of the Republic also remain under the protection of the RSFSR.

- 12.) The RSFSR guarantees all citizens, political parties, social organisations, mass movements, and religious organisations that keep within the scope of the constitution of the RSFSR equal legal possibilities to participate in public and social life.
- 13.) The separation of legislature, executive and judiciary is the most important principle of the functioning of the RSFSR under the rule of law; ...

their restoration as independent states. Estonia was the first Soviet republic to declare its sovereignty in the autumn of 1988 and Lithuania the first to proclaim its independence in March 1990. Until the end of 1990 all Soviet republics and a string of autonomous republics had passed declarations of sovereignty demanding extensive political and economic autonomy. It proved to be crucial that the Russian Republic under Boris Yeltsin also decided to break away from the Soviet centre (compare source).

Gorbatchev had clearly been taken aback by these national movements for emancipation and, therefore, his reaction came late and was rather inconsistent. The weakened Soviet power attempted to rescue state unity with repression (such as in Tbilissi and Vilnius) and, subsequently, with concessions in the form of a new Union treaty. The attempted coup of August 1991, however, wrecked all such efforts. Now, virtually all republics of the union declared their independence. After a referendum in Ukraine - the second most important Soviet republic after Russia – had brought a great majority in favour of independence the fate of the Soviet Union was sealed. Led by the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus the republics of the Union replaced the Soviet Union in December 1991 by a loose federation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The Forming of States and Nations in the Post-Soviet World

It was not the CIS, however, but the 15 former Soviet republics themselves that were consolidated as sovereign national states and recognised by the international community. The difficulties of forming states and nations proved to be immense, though. New state institutions had to be set up from scratch and filled with life. National ideologies were constructed with central importance and a focal standing attributed to national history. Many representatives of the Communist elites suddenly turned into nationalists, a change of elites, therefore, did not take place. The economic disentanglement of the republics that had been closely interlinked for centuries by the principle of the division of labour proved to be another issue posing great difficulties.

The preconditions for launching the move towards independence were somewhat different in the various states. The three Baltic States were the ones best equipped and prepared for national independence and its consequences.

The Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians could recur to national mass movements, to their independence in the interwar period and to an old Central European historical tradition, and, economically, they were the most advanced regions. The problem of the sizeable Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia that were of course supported by Moscow could also be alleviated. After a civil war in Transnistria the Republic of Moldova, which also had not come to the Soviet Union until World War II, was consolidated as a

sovereign state between Romania and Ukraine.

Strong national movements that leaned on old national and cultural traditions had paved the way for independence in Georgia and Armenia. In the Caucasus area, however, the interethnic tensions were so high that civil wars such as those fought for the possession of Karabakh and Abkhazia hamper the consolidation of national states up until the present day.

In the five Central Asian nations



Statue of freedom at Mamaya Hill, Wolgograd. The memorial complex at Mamaya Hill had been built in the early 1950ies in memory of the sacrifice of the 'Great Patriotic War' (1941–45). Foto by Alois Ecker

THE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND CHECHNYANS:

	tury Russia sets out to conquer the Caucasus
1785	Chechnyan war of resistance under Sheikh Mansur
1818	Foundation of the Russian fortress of Grosnyj
1834–1859	Chechnyan and Dagestan war of resistance against Russia under Imam Schamil
Since 1859	Incorporation of Chechnya into the Tsarist Empire
1917–1926	Anticolonial Chechnyan resistance movement
1922	Formation of the Chechnyan Autonomous Region within the RSFSR
1936	Formation of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic within the RSFSR
1944	Deportation of all Chechnyans to Soviet Asia, Dissolution of the Autonomous Republic
1957	Return of the Chechnyans, Restoration of the (territorially smaller) Autonomous Republic
1973	Unrest in Grosnyj
1989	Population of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR 1,27 mill. (58% Chechnyans, 13% Ingushs, 23%
	Russians); most Russians leave the Republic in the years 1990 to 1993
Autumn 1991	General Dudajev elected President of Chechnya, Proclamation of Independence
1992	Chechnya does not sign the Russian Federation Treaty
	Formation of the sovereign Ingush Republic
December 1994	Invasion of Russian troops in Chechnya
June 1995	Chechnyans take hostages at the town of Budjonnovsk, over one hundred victims
August 1996	End of war, withdrawal of the Russian troops, de-facto-recognition of Chechnya's
-	Independence on a five-year basis
1997	Free elections in Chechnya: Maschadov becomes President of Chechnya
1999–	New Russian-Chechnyan war

created by Soviet politics national movements hardly surfaced at all in the years previous to 1991, they had a stable identity, however, based on Islam and autonomous historical traditions. These have lent support to the tendency towards authoritarian systems with strong presidents, as were established in all five states. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the large minorities of Russians and other Europeans pose a potential for conflict. Only in Tadzhikistan, however, has there been a bloodstained civil war between regional conflicting groups.

The partly Russified Ukrainians and Byelorussians were far weaker consolidated nationally and had to assert themselves against Russian claims of monopolisation. While the tendencies in Belarus towards moving closer to Russia have grown in support, Ukraine remains set for its course of independence, in spite of severe economic difficulties and internal tensions. The Russian minority, comprising more than 20 per cent of the total population, and the regular controversies regarding the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea fleet pollute the climate of relations with Russia.

The Russian Federation, too, that lays claim to universal succession of the Soviet Union, is but a young national state. On the one hand the Russians view themselves as an ethnic nation, at the same time, however, a new Russian nation is constructed as Staatsvolk and supposed to contain the minorities alike that amount to 18.5 per cent of the overall population. Moreover, the memory of the imperial Soviet Union, whose main ethnic group were the Russians after all, still remains ever so present. In a federation treaty Moscow succeeded in integrating most republics of the RSFSR into the new state by making concessions. Chechnya alone strives for independence, a quest Russia seeks to thwart by the use of armed force (compare table).

The post-Soviet world is currently still in the phase of the consolidation of states and nations. The construction of the nations partly follows the concept of the ethnic nation (for instance in the Baltic states or in Transcaucasia) and to some extent also more that of the political nation (Russia, Kazakhstan). Anyway, the flow of problems just does not seem to dry up: adding to interethnic tensions and conflicts between the states themselves there are the difficulties of economic transformation, of the implementation of legal institutes that are indeed promoting the rule of law and of setting up a functioning political and administrative system. The Soviet legacy weighs heavily. With the exception of the Baltic States, that seem well and truly on their way towards joining the EU, the prospects for the future remain uncertain.

The picture of the post-Soviet states drawn in our media is somewhat reminiscent indeed of a horror scenario: poverty, chaos, corruption, Mafia and atavistic ethnic conflicts make the headlines. For all of this we tend to forget that in many ways these regions are only catching up on what shook other parts of Europe in the period of the two world wars. In spite of the abovementioned wars at the southern periphery the post-imperial conflicts and "ethnic cleansings" have taken a less bloody course than in Central Europe during the first half of the century. Even in this, the era of European unity there is no cause for Western Eurocentric arrogance but all the more for critical solidarity with Eastern Europe

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Problems of the Transformation Period in Russia

In accordance with the customary definition transformation shall be compre-

hended here as a long-term phase of development that comprises socioeconomic, cultural and political processes of change and eventually leads to a qualitatively new system. With each transformation there is a dominant trend, but one also encounters entirely contradictory patterns.

In the case of Russia it was the tendency towards the privatisation of both state and politics that distinctly leapt to the eye from the late seventies onwards and continues up until the present day. More and more spheres of society eluded state control and supervision, as is reflected in the growth of organised crime. This has generally been, and still is, deplored as the collapse of state authority and has, inter alia, led to the call for a strong leader but also to permanent attempts and temptations to restore, establish and enforce state authority, by every civil or uncivil means.

The government-dictated introduction of market economy in fact produced the emergence of, albeit limited, markets but it also facilitated, however, the germination of organised retaliations against the market, the formation of monopolies and, as a result, an alarming increase in protectionist strategies employed by the "market reformers" themselves.

The transition to democratic institutions and processes brought counter strategies on the scene that were designed to at least tone down a little the uncertainties of the democratic formulation of political demands. A particularity of post-Soviet transformation is the breakdown of the empire that entailed numerous spots of unrest and conflict and forced the Russian Federation to redefine military security and reappraise strategic territories.

Flashback

The privatisation of state and politics can be read as a somewhat delayed reaction to the Stalinist campaigns of mobilisation, which were supposed to involve the entire population, all parts of society, in view of achieving the respective goal set (for instance, compliance with the plans, collectivisation, industrialisation, war). Even though these campaigns were not abandoned altogether under Khrushchev the elites at least were not compelled anymore to feel subject to the constant threat of physical annihilation. They acquired, as it were, the right of a political death: party leaders who



The 'eminences' of Marxist-Leninism being stored in a museum. During the Soviet period Marxist-Leninism served as a binding philosophical codex that gave orientation for decisions in political and social life. Many intellectuels in Russia today discover a lack of moral orientation since the communist patriarchs have gone. Foto: Hans Peter Stiebing, in: Die Zeit, No 29, 1998, p. 52

had fallen out of favour were not liguidated anymore but sent into exile instead, to Mongolia, for instance, as Soviet ambassador. It was not until the years of Brezhnev's regime that society as a whole was granted the factual right to be left alone by politics. Now, one increasingly found possibilities, therefore, of evading the official mobilisation campaigns, for example by travelling instead of dutifully casting one's vote. This also marked the departure of the process of the privatisation of public property and public areas. State posts became sinecures; "social property" and the factories, kolkhozes and sovkhozes were devoted to private purposes and the black market as well as corruption spread at a considerable pace. Thus, at a very early stage already in the phase of late socialism structures had crystallised that were to determine the eventual course of reform attempts geared towards the needs of market economy. Such a ramified system of illegality quite obviously had to be supported and kept going by reliable arrangements or at least by a tacit general consensus of acting as if everything was fine. Naturally, there were voices that attempted to denounce the worst excesses of this system; as a rule, however, they came to nothing (for instance in the Uzbekian "cotton scandal", in which, among others, Brezhnev's son-in-law was also deeply entangled). Gorbatchev's perestroika was intended as an attempt to legalise elite privileges. To the extent that general recognition of the system's untenability spread the elites desperately sought to safeguard their privileges, somehow get them across into the post-Soviet era and leave as little as possible to chance. Generally, one did not quite know what to expect from democracy and market economy (in the end the KGB proved to be the ones that understood best of all what lay ahead of them in practice), one was willing, though, to allow for a limited scope of political pluralism and market competition to go along with it, as long as there would not occur any radical changes. The coup of August 17th, 1991, was the crucial moment that finally triggered the collapse of the Soviet Union, although the writing had been on the wall for quite some time, a result not least of the attempts by the Yeltsin-led group to destroy the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and build the Russian Federation as the new power base.

Reforms After the End of the USSR

The radical group of reformers could only seize power since after the attempted coup not only the ultra-orthodox elements but also all the moderate reformers within the Communist Party were discredited. The radical reformers were a group of younger intellectuals who were reasonably familiar with Western economic concepts though not, or not enough, accustomed to the tough reality of the Soviet economy. They entirely expected to encounter social and political resilience and opposition against their programme but they hoped to push through the reforms within a period of roughly six months, and thereby make them irreversible. They had, however, misjudged the scale of reactions from the population and the enterprises as well as several direct consequences of price deregulation. Thus, a series of strikes in key regions followed and prices were soaring much faster and higher than expected so that a spiral of hyperinflation was kicked off. The subsequent budget cuts on the one hand led to a virtually complete payment strike on the part of the enterprises and companies, to an interim recourse to barter trade as well as to the general disappearance of cash money; on the other hand, the reformers found themselves compelled to buy political loyalty by way of dishing out subsidies. The latter in fact perfectly well matched Yeltsin's chosen strategies as the President of the Russian Federation: the budget was increasingly utilised as a political instrument, which, evidently, was diametrically opposed to the concept of monetarism (money value stability through budget discipline). One cannot argue, therefore, that monetarist-free market reforms were introduced and realised in Russia. The social and economic consequences of the half-hearted and inconsistent reforms were such that the concept of market economy (and along with it, all in one go, that of democracy, too) looks discredited within the foreseeable future.

The role of Western advisers and economists has been widely overrated: on the one hand formal compliance at least with Western proposals and formulas was the prerequisite for Russia's being granted credits on the part of international financial institutions, on the other, however, all these promises have always been of a distinctly political nature; they served the purpose of providing support to certain public figures (most notably, President Yeltsin) against their political opponents at home and, in turn, only required a formal assurance on the part of the Russian government to set about implementing the reforms demanded by the West. The situation today is still very much the same. Other than in the first period of reforms that was characterised by a certain mood of optimism one seems to have realised in the West, too, that – quite as in the proverb – one might well be able to take Russia to the water, though one cannot make her drink to the full. Russia is handled with kid gloves on the part of Western politics and diplomacy; harsh criticism of Russian politics is left to the media.

Regional Disparities

If indeed at all, the Western experts were crucial only in the first few months of radical reform. Then, Western trouble-shooters quickly became the source of trouble themselves, for, as a rule, they tended to underrate political and social risks or view them as disruptive influences on the smooth functioning of the economic system, respectively. In reality, however, such disruptive influences cannot be eliminated by a "criminalisation". Western economic experts also tend to regard economic systems in need of reform as some sort of tabula rasa and thereby neglect climatic or geographical specificities and other factors that are hard to influence. In Russia 60 per cent of the population live in permafrost areas (there, the average annual temperature drops below 5 degrees Celsius), which in itself predetermines a certain mode of the allocation of investment capital, labour force and other economic parameters. Furthermore, there are grown structures such as the regional concentration of large enterprises that all badly need to be restored to profitability: in most cases these concerns hold production and employment monopolies, they have to be subsidised from the means of regional budgets and all in all amount to an untenable financial burden for the overall state budget. The export enterprises (oil and gas, to some extent the metal industry, timber) represent the sole exception and each respective region profits from them. Regions with processing industries producing for the domestic market (one might think of the textile industry concentrated around Moscow as a paradigmatic example) are regularly depressed areas with high unemployment, vastly adverse regional budgets, from which wages and pensions cannot be financed, and a poor general and in particular energy supply. Typically, the political opposition (Communist Party, Liberal Democrats) is fairly strong in such regions. The dividing line runs between poor and rich regions but also between urban and rural areas. The various regions increasingly seal themselves off from one another, either by issuing their own means of payment (postal orders) or by cutting down on administrative settlement permits. The number of regions showing adverse budgets has steadily risen in this process; today a mere six of the 89 different Russian regions altogether (this figure includes Chechnya) manage without darting on federal budget subsidies. Macro-economic possibilities of regulation are, therefore, very limited. **Consequences of Privatisation**

The venture of privatisation, un-

THE PRICE TAG OF RUSSIA'S ORGANISED CRIME BY LOUISE I. SHELLEY

Organised crime has a devastating impact on Russia's economy. It discourages foreign investment, deprives the country of its tax base, dominates the banking sector and financial markets, and exacerbates the already widespread problem of corruption. But probably the most damaging aspect of Russian organised crime activity is its contribution to large-scale capital flight.

Why Is Russia's Organised Crime Special?

Colombian drug traffickers repatriate most of their profits. Italian authorities were able to freeze \$3 billion of Mafia assets in the mid-1990s because much of the profits of Italian organised crime were invested domestically. In contrast, Russian organised crime groups repatriate little of their profits, instead depositing their proceeds in foreign countries, establishing banks in offshore havens. A specialist on capital flight reported at a recent Ministry of Interior conference in Moscow that \$150 billion had been exported from Russia since 1991. This figure may be high but conservative estimates are still more than \$50 billion. A minimum of 40 percent of the estimated \$2 billion in monthly capital flight is attributable to organised crime groups. The problem of capital flight dwarfs the lamented absence of foreign investment (a figure estimated at approximately \$6 billion since 1991).

Russian organised crime groups do more damage to their country's tax base than do their compatriots in other countries. Apart from not paying taxes, organised crime groups, by usurping the state's tax collection role, often deprive the state of needed resources. Recent research on the Russian customs service revealed that duties are paid on only 35 of every 1,000 cars imported into the country. Regional crime bosses control customs warehouses in many parts of the country. Many customs officials, who are on the payroll of crime groups, collude to divert customs duties to the crime organisations.

Russian organised crime has also infiltrated the domestic banking sector and financial markets more deeply than have their counterparts in other countries. Millions of citizens have lost their limited savings in pyramid schemes and in banking institutions that have collapsed. Hundreds of banks are owned or controlled by organised crime groups that are laundering money (abroad by Russian organised crime groups and within Russia by foreign organised crime groups). Bankers who refuse to launder money cannot compete with banks that provide such services. This criminalization of the banking sector and financial institutions has boosted capital flight.

Russian organised crime groups secured a massive transfer of state property because the privatization occurred rapidly, on a huge scale, without legal safeguards, and without transparency. These groups used force, if necessary, but relied mainly on their large financial assets and their close ties to the former Communist Party elite, the military, and the banking sector. (Colombian, Italian, and Mexican organised crime groups have also benefited from the privatization of state resources, but on a much more modest scale.) Amassing privatized property even before the collapse of the Soviet state, the Russian Mafia now controls more than 40 percent of the total economy. In some sectors, such as consumer markets, real estate, and banking, their role is even greater. In other countries crime organisations also diversify from the illicit sector to the legitimate economy. But in Russia, organised crime groups are dominating both *legitimate and illegitimate economic sectors simultaneously. The new owners,* often uninterested in making their enterprises function, drain the resources and transfer the proceeds abroad, exacerbating the problems of both capital flight and nonpayment of wages.

Fighting on the Ground

The cancer of organised crime cannot be addressed solely of the national level or through officials in Moscow. There are significant geographic variations. For example, organised crime is based in the shipping industry in the Far East, in the appropriation and export of natural resources in the Urals, and in banking and real estate in Moscow. The weakness of the central Russian state and the rise of regional power means that assistance programmes must involve a variety of individuals and groups apart from state institutions. A multipronged strategy is called for:

• Economic and legal assistance programmes must be targeted to the most criminalized sectors of individual regions.

• Programmes must seek to build civil society and help secure citizens' property rights. International programmes to fight organised crime must work with groups like the Association of Russian Bankers, workers groups addressing issues of illegal privatization, and consumers groups educating citizens on the risks of investing in the largely unregulated banking sector, commodity markets, and stock exchanges.

• An integrated strategy of economic, social, civil, and criminal legal assistance is needed. Reform of the banking sector, assistance in privatization, and maintenance of a free press must be implemented along with legal assistance to fight organised crime. Also required is coordinated legal reform in the criminal and civil areas, including enforcement measures; banking, tax, and regulatory reform; protection and education of journalists; and the empowerment of citizens to fight organised crime.

• Individual countries and international organisations assisting in the privatization process, such as the World Bank and the EU, must pay more attention to corruption. They must work to ensure that citizens have more access to the property now being privatized and to legal assistance in this area.

• More attention must be paid to ensuring the openness of the privatization process. Citizens must have better access to information about the integrity and viability of the institutions in which they may invest.

• Building integrity in the banking sector and in financial markets must be a key objective of any assistance programmee to combat Russian organised crime. Civil and criminal legal assistance must proceed in tandem to ensure that new economic institutions can be defended against further criminalization.

To sum up, efforts to decriminalize the Russian economy must define the problem more broadly than simply as money laundering. Donor nations and institutions must better coordinate their help in establishing the regulation and enforcement mechanisms for effective governing of financial institutions and markets. Assistance programmes must identify areas of the economy that have managed to avoid massive criminalization.

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dertaken against the background of a monopolised and already strongly criminalised economy and regions that are distinctly drifting apart was doomed to failure from the very beginning. Lucrative enterprises had been "coldly" privatised long before the official start of privatisation. State-owned enterprises were transformed into closed joint-stock companies with the management holding the crucial voting shares. Another very popular option for the company nomenclature to turn state property to private use consists in founding private consulting firms that sign lucrative service deals with the state-owned enterprise (or formally privatised enterprise, that is). The results of the actual privatisation were that approximately 80 per cent of the enterprises are still dominated by a conglomerate of former regional party and management elites. Around 20 per cent of the companies were bought up by transregional financial groups; in

both cases it seems rather likely that a large amount of capital stemming from illegal transactions is involved. This capital, in turn, to some extent consists of actual Mafia capital and, as far as the rest goes, quite simply of untaxed black money. With an estimated share of more than half of the GDP produced by the shadow economy legality in the economic sector seems wishful thinking for the time being. The Russian Mafia that has originally sprung from the Stalinist Gulags is strongly diversified and regionalised today; what is more, the Mafia, for it needs the support by politics and the administrative system after all to conduct its commercial activities, is tightly interwoven with both through a network of corruption. The suspicion is that there is always a hint of the Mafia when big money is made or potentially up for the taking, respectively: in the energy sector, in certain branches of the basic industry (e.g. the aluminium industry), in the banking sector and in the media (advertising). The majority of the murders obviously committed by the Mafia can be connected to either of these sectors and served the purpose of facilitating or precipitating hostile takeovers.

When sometimes the Mafia origins of Western capitalism are underlined, one has to bear in mind that initial conditions in Russia are somewhat different: there is neither the legal nor the free-market prerequisite for the development of a Civil Society and economy. The Mafia is not interested in reforms but in obtaining monopolies that show high profits. Earned capital is not re-invested in Russia but transferred abroad. The reforms in the private sector have, therefore, tendentiously thrust Russia closer towards an uncivil economy.

The endeavour to obtain privileged positions of monopoly can be detected throughout all sections of society. The list of those misusing

State Duma Election Results, December 19, 1999

Political Parties	Deputies on Party Lists	Directly Elected Deputies	Total (% of Votes Cast)
Communist Party of Russia (KPRF) Gennadij Sjuganov	67	46	113 (24,3%)
Unity		_	
Sergei Schoigu	64	8	72 (23,32%)
Fatherland-Pan-Russia (OVR)			
Jevgenij Primakov & Jurii Luschkov	36	30	66 (13,33%)
Unity Block of Right-Wing Forces (SPS)			
Sergej Kirijenko	24	5	29 (8,52%)
Block Shirinowskij			
Vladimir Schirinovksij	17		17 (5,98%)
Jabloko			
Grigorij Javlinskij	16	4	20 (5,93%)
Our House Russia		7	7 (1,2%)
DPA		2	2 (0,59%)
Russian People's Unity		2	2 (0,37%)
Spiritual Heritage		1	1 (0,1%)
Block General Andrey Nikolaev, Svjatoslav Fedorov		1	1 (0,56%)
Congress of Russian Societies and Jurij Boldyrev Movement		1	1 (0,62%)
Pensioner's Party		1	1 (1,98%)
Russian Socialist Party		1	1 (0,24%)
Independent Candidates		106	106
Total of Deputies	224	215	439

as political positions are utilised for private moneymaking. Parliamentary seats are much soughtafter since they guarantee protection from criminal prosecution.

Problems in the Strategic Environment

The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new problem zone, the adjoining "foreign" countries. This zone is characterised by armed conflicts, a constant sense of instability that even swipes Russia herself and a bulk of unsolved sovereignty issues. Russia's main concern is to keep con-

public positions or distributive functions in general for private advantages is endless. This includes corrupt civil servants who have the power to either grant or withdraw and deny licences, policemen cashing in on fees imposed without authorisation as well as railway inspectors charging transport duties, as it were, according to the value of the trader's goods. In these cases and also in the characteristic patterns of conducting economic transactions, let alone in how the state treats its citizens (e.g. the threat or even use of force as regards debt and tax collection) the lack of a legal tradition based on the absolute rule of law becomes sharply obvious. Such "uncivil" patterns of conduct, in turn, are engendered by the lack of faith in the existing legal institutions. Since one cannot count on the courts or the administrative bodies either. one feels compelled to resort to the private, self-administered, enforcement of one's interests - yet another example of the uncivil privatisation of the public sphere.

The obvious and gaping absence of the rule of law also affects politics and its organisational structures. There is still no party statute, and the rank growth of political parties does not only confuse the voters but is proof altogether that politics has yet to be consolidated. Parties are brought into being for short-term purposes and calculations, mostly they neither have social backing nor can they boast a certain segment of committed voters. In the absence of stable institutions and credible programmes politics inevitably revolves around a few dominant figures. Parliamentary elections are merely of secondary importance, which does not help either, so that the political cycle culminates in the presidential elections held every four years. One consequence of the frailty of the institutions is reflected also in a strong trend towards populism employed by both sides, the government as well as the opposition.

Politics is also privatised in so far

trol over the raw materials, in particular the rich oil and gas deposits in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Furthermore, new strategic lines of defence have to be taken up in the west and south and the corresponding military installations, especially strategic air defence posts, have to be set up. NATO's advance up to the Baltic States is perceived as less menacing then the eventual prospect of losing control over affairs in the north of the Caucasus. In the northern Caucasus runs one of the most important confrontation lines of world politics today. Following an American scheme, a belt of friendly countries, by and large at peace, that is designed to stretch from Azerbaijan to Moldova is about to be created. The planned pipeline connecting Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan at the Mediterranean is supposed to compel these countries, which to some extent are still feuding with each other, to cooperate, while also making them independent of the

Russian Federation. Russia, naturally, has no intentions of losing control over the Caspian and Azerbaijan oil deposits and still contemplates building a pipeline that would run across Dagestan and lead to the Russian port of Novorossijsk. Chechnva as the main trouble spot does not only pose a threat to the stability of Dagestan but also jeopardises the continuity of the entire Russian south. Thus, bringing peace to Chechnya is Russia's prime objective, whatever the means and costs. The remilitarisation, xenophobia and the call for a strong hand are the practically inevitable consequences of this situation, all of which circumstances that will hardly prove to be conducive to democratisation. Apparently, the generals have been given the go-ahead to resolve the

Chechnya crisis with whatever military means at their disposal: government and diplomacy, it seems, are demoted to the role of orchestrators. As a military solution seems highly unlikely the struggle in Chechnva alone effectively means that Russia is headed for an authoritarian stance in the near future, let alone Chechnya, where two wars have broken up the traditional structure and completely transformed the country. It is not any longer the clan chiefs (*taipe*) or spiritual leaders that have the greatest say but warlords

the majority of whom is not oriented towards Islam but heeds and follows the logic of military combat instead. There is of course - as there is along the entire Islamic stretch of the former Soviet Union – a popular Islam (*adat*), which represents a mixture that is comprised of local, mostly pre-Islamic, and genuinely Islamic traditions. High Islam and in particular radical forms such as Saudi Arabian Wahhabism have always remained foreign here. One should be very careful indeed, therefore, with simple and catching characterisations of post-Soviet conflicts as "civilisation conflicts". In the Caucasian area at any rate one encounters a wealth of alliances and confrontations cutting straight through all "civilisations" and their boundaries.

A truly significant problem of the transformation of Russia consists in the lack of consensus among the relevant political forces as to what exactly constitutes the objective of transformation. If there is a common denominator at all, it is the premiss that a return to the Soviet system is out of the question, not least for reasons of practical politics. This does not have to say that some groups would not exploit the general nostalgia for order and stability; the Russian Communist Party, the strongest party represented in the State Duma, makes the most of every opportunity to bewail the



destruction of the Soviet Union and promptly demand its (peaceful) restoration. In reality, however, nobody wants to or, as a matter of fact, could do so; the break-up of the CIS only serves to prove how far one has already grown apart politically and, what is more, it would mean a severe economic strain for Russia. Thus, one has to put up with symbolic activities (e.g. the "reunification" with Belarus).

Practically all political reforms remain remarkably vague in terms of defining the actual goals of reform and the possible range is rather Group of veterans from the 'Great Patriotic War' waiting this year (2000) to commemorate the beginning of the war on 22 June (1941). The town and people of Wolgograd view it as their special responsibilitytowards history to keep alive the memory of the battles at Stalingrad. Foto by Alois Ecker broad. The Russian Communist Party apparently wants a major wave of re-nationalisation, and on the other side of the political spectrum the "liberal" groups seem to entertain the idea of a social market economy with elements of state regulation. All groups share the desire for preferential treatment of Russian producers, a demand Shirinovskhy has formulated as "the compartmentalisation of the Russian market for the coming fifty years". One could easily find arguments for and against Russia's integration into the world market, respectively. It is obvious on the one hand that Russia as a newcomer with an antiquated industry would be at the mercy of fierce international competition if import bans and restrictions were completely lifted, whereas the OEEC-countries are well capable of defending themselves against Russian imports, provided they manage to compete at all. On the other hand Russia will hardly be developed without competition and the Russian economy is capable of surviving even without the stimuli provided by growth and principal reforms, owing to its abundance of raw materials. The Russian economy, not unlike many of its products, is generally not at a particularly high standard of development, but it is robust. This is precisely the reason why in Russia, unlike in the Central European reform states, one might credibly advocate several completely different scenarios of development and variations of reform. Moreover, the country does not stand a real chance of being admitted to the EU. conversely, however, Russia does not have to account for making her economy, society and politics fit for Europe. Transformation in Russia will, therefore, follow an independent, winding and not always clear and unambiguous path.

Basic Data Russian Federation

Population Total 1998	146,9 mill.
Gross Domestic Product 1998	337,9 bill. Dollars
GDP per capita 1998	2.300 Dollars
National Debts 1998	64,7% of GDP

Social Indicators (1992–1998, most recent figures available for each year)Amount of Population below Poverty Line31 %Life Expectancy at Birth67 yearsInfant Mortality1,7 per cent

Economic Development 1991–1998 (in per cent)

	1985–1990	1991–1998	1997	1998
GDP	2,5	-6,5%	0,9%	-4,6%
GDP per capita	-	-6,7%	0,8%	-6,4%

Source: Website der Weltbank; M. Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sowjetunion. München 1998, 1043.

Estimated Share of Population below or at Subsistence Minimum (in per cent, figures from a survey in 1993)

Region	Less than Subsistence Minimum	At Subsistence Minimum
Moscow – City	5,2	6,3
Moscow – Region	11,2	9,0
Dagestan	65,9	10,4
Russian Federation	14,5	8,1

Source: A. Surinov/I. Kolosnitsyn, Social inequality and poverty in Russia, in: N. Ott/G.G. Wagner (Hg.), Income inequality and poverty, Heidelberg 1997, 183ff.

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FROM AN ARTICEL BY JEGOR GAIDAR (ACTING PRIME MINISTER 1992)

Worst of both worlds

As I just mentioned, practically all postcommunist countries have experienced problems with this combination of soft budget constraints and soft administrative constraints. What is the difference between "market socialist" economies before the start of serious reform and in the postcommunist reality? Before the reforms, enterprise managers were firmly under a system of totalitarian political control. They had to behave. They had to show that they were loyal members of the party. It is also unfortunately true that many managers skimmed off funds from the enterprises, enriching themselves and their families. There were limits to such transgressions, however. The enterprise still had to meet the requirements of the central plan and still had to provide for the welfare of its workers. Failure to carry out fundamental managerial duties would be regarded as breaking the manager's contract with the political establishment. This was simply not done and could result in serious repercussions for the offending manager. After the crash of communism, the totalitarian regime, with all its social and administrative restraints, ceased to exist. Then, the combination of easy budget constraints and easy administrative constraints produced most undesirable consequences for the enterprises, for society, and for the economy as a whole. These developments were entirely to be expected, given the social environment that emerged after the breakup of the totalitarian regime. Why? First, because of a mind-set deeply ingrained over 70 years of socialism. Far from being distinct entities, enterprises were regarded as part of the state, a result of socialist industrialization. How could an enterprise be disciplined on the trivial grounds that for a time it was unable to fulfill its tax obligations? It would be absurd: the duty of the state was to provide for the enterprise, not the other way around.

Second, because enterprise managers were part of the social infrastructure of the totalitarian society, they were in no way different from other officials in the state administration. They had gone to university together, they worked together, they socialized with one another. They could also collude together. Unless there were countervailing political and legal safeguards – and over the past decade there have been few – this combination of feeble budgetary controls, weak administrative controls, and "old boy" cronyism engendered an inefficient, stagnant, and extremely corrupt environment.

(Source: Website des Instituts für Probleme der Übergangsperiode, Moskau)

EXTRACT FROM A STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT AND CENTRAL BANK OF THE RF, SUPPORTING THE APPLICATION FOR A STANDBY-CREDIT BY THE IMF, 13, JULY, 1999.

Revenue collection and tax policy

13. The fiscal adjustment planned for 1999 includes an increase in cash revenue of nearly 3 percent of GDP. Efforts to increase revenues of the federal government will take a two-pronged approach. First, in order to close the fiscal gap in 1999, a number of tax measures will be implemented, aimed primarily at increasing taxation of consumption and at capturing some of the windfall gains to exporters owing to the large depreciation of the ruble since August 1998. Second, the government will implement measures aimed at improving taxpayer compliance, including several steps envisaged under previous programmes, which will lay the foundation for improved collections in 1999 and beyond, and set the stage for an eventual reduction in the high statutory rates for direct taxes and the elimination of a number of particularly inefficient taxes.

14. Underlying our efforts to improve revenue collection will be an end to the widespread use of tax offsets and ad hoc negotiated tax payments. In support of this step, the government will achieve passage in the Federation Council of amendments which remove from the Budget Code those articles permitting offsets. Abstaining from any form of tax offset arrangements will be a continuous performance criterion under the 1999 programme. Further, the government will not, under any circumstances, conduct a tax amnesty. 15. The government has adopted a package of revenue measures for 1999 which aims to raise 1 3/4 percent of GDP. The 1999 budget provides for the transfer of 3 percentage points of the personal income tax to the federal government, which will generate 1/2 percent of GDP in revenue and an increase of land- and water resource-related tax rates, which will increase collections by an additional 0.2 percent of GDP. In addition, given our overriding need to generate revenue, an export tax on oil, petrochemicals, timber, ferrous and nonferrous metals and other commodities has been introduced on a temporary basis, which is expected to generate about 0.6 percent of GDP in revenue this year. Additional revenue of 0.4 percent of GDP will be raised through the adoption of a number of measures to improve tax legislation, including the introduction of an annual tax on luxury automobiles; reduction of preferential (10 percent) VAT taxation; and enhancing administrative control over production and sale of alcoholic products. Finally, we will forego any reductions in the VAT rate until tax compliance has shown a durable improvement, and at least until January 1, 2000. In this regard the President has vetoed the law putting the VAT rate reduction in place as of July 1, 1999.

16. A number of changes in the tax law will aid in revenue collection. We have reduced the number of tax preferences, including some tax exemptions for closed administrative territories. In order to further strengthen the tax system, the draft 2000 budget will contain a provision mandating the transfer of federal taxes collected in closed territories to the federal budget – which will automatically eliminate the possibility for closed territories to provide exemptions on these taxes – with corresponding compensation to the territories from the federal budget. In addition, the government will take additional administrative measures by September 30, 1999 to limit the application of these exemptions in 1999. Finally, we will restore the implementation of the gas excise tax on an accruals basis.

17. We are revitalizing our efforts to enhance tax administration. Central to this programme has been the passage of amendments to Part I of the Tax Code, in order to address a number of important deficiencies in the current Tax Code. Among the changes introduced are those: increasing the powers of the tax authorities by eliminating the need for the Ministry of Taxation to use the already over-burdened court system and giving them the ability to issue liens on bank accounts of delinquent taxpayers; introducing legal sanctions against tax agents who fail to deposit withheld taxes into government accounts in a timely fashion; eliminating

the ceiling on total interest accruals on overdue taxes, as well as the ceiling on the interest rate; extending deadlines for collection orders; and introducing stronger penalties and sanctions for failure to file tax invoices, filing of false invoices, or bookkeeping practices in violation of the law.

18. The government intends to increase its efforts to reduce tax arrears in the energy sector. The government has introduced individual schedules for each oil company to move progressively to full payment of taxes in cash in compliance with the law of the Russian Federation beginning from November 1999 and for Gazprom to do the same from July 2000. Until conventional tax administration proves fully effective and at least until the end of 1999 the government is taking an extraordinary short-term measure, starting with the monthly allocations for June 1999, to permit access to the export oil pipeline transport system only for oil companies, which themselves – or whose holding company and all affiliates thereof that have any significant commercial relationship with the oil companies in question – have no arrears of scheduled federal tax obligations arising on or after April 1, 1999. Any company with such federal tax arrears outstanding at the beginning of the month in which export pipeline allocations for the following month are determined will be denied access to export pipeline capacity for the entirety of the month in question. Pipeline access will not be limited by the government for any other reason unrelated to normal technical requirements and payment compliance as set out in oil transportation contracts. Pre-April, 1999 tax arrears will be cleared by December 31, 1999.

19. In addition, to reduce the current very high level of tax arrears throughout the economy, we will intensify efforts to establish effective collection processes, and to initiate asset seizures and bankruptcy actions in appropriate cases; take action to impose sanctions, provided under the Criminal Code, on enterprise managers contributing to noncompliance; and redirect our tax examination programme to focus on cases with maximum potential revenue yield. By end-1999, we will recover at least Rub 8 billion in tax arrears for the federal budget other than in the oil and gas sectors, based on tax examinations. Finally, we will take all necessary steps to make the Federal Debt Center – set up in 1998 to sell assets seized from tax debtors – fully operational, including the passage of a government resolution clarifying that it has an exclusive right to sell attached property.

20. The government intends to support the implementation of recently-established plans in the Ministry of Taxation (MOT) that are designed to improve its ability to control the affairs of taxpayers whose business activities span several regions, and to achieve efficiency gains through a programme of work consolidation initiatives. The government is also committed to strengthening control over and monitoring of the largest taxpayers. Toward this end, it will take steps to effectively implement the core system of large taxpayer inspectorates to deal with the largest taxpayers on a consolidated basis, and will ensure that the units are adequately funded and staffed, and are provided the necessary legal authority to conduct their work, direct taxpayers to file returns, and specify where tax payments will be made.

21. Steps have also been taken to improve customs collections. To enhance coverage of shuttle trade, we have imposed a mandatory customs inspection for all importers declaring customs payments below a specified threshold per kilogram. In addition, the possibility for tax-exempt imports of cars has been eliminated, with privileges for certain groups of citizens and for cars clearing customs in Belarus removed. In order to reduce losses to the federal budget, the government will, by July 10, 1999, adopt a resolution increasing the list of commodities whose duty-free importation into Kaliningrad is subject to quotas. The government will do everything within its power to ensure that a federal law eliminating excise and VAT exemptions for goods imported to Kaliningrad is adopted by end-1999.

22. In recent years, the federal government has received a decreasing share of revenues from collections of taxes defined as federal in Part I of the Tax Code, while the federal government's share of total tax arrears has been growing at a rapid rate. To address this issue, we will take several steps. Beginning with the 2001 budget, we will reflect sharing of federal taxes with the regions as an expenditure item, and will execute all such sharing through the federal treasury. Further, in the context of the 2001 budget, we will adopt a single rate of revenue assignment for shared federal taxes, to limit the scope for regions to abuse the revenue-sharing arrangement and to allow simplification of the tax payment process.

Expenditure policy and management

23. Fiscal adjustment in 1999 and beyond will rest to a significant degree on substantial reductions in real spending as well as enhanced control of expenditure commitments to avoid a new buildup of budgetary arrears. The 1999 budget foresees a reduction in noninterest spending to 9.6 percent of GDP, a decline of 2 percent of GDP compared with 1998, implying large reductions in real spending. The government is concerned that these cuts will not be sustainable over the medium term, and is therefore undertaking a concerted effort to identify and eliminate inefficient or unproductive expenditure programmes.

24. To this end, the government began to implement already in 1998 a comprehensive expenditure reduction plan, including substantial downsizing and organisational reform in the public sector. The number of federal executive authorities and other legal entities that are first-tier recipients of federal money declined from 132 at the beginning of last year to 106 in the 1999 budget. In addition, the number of positions in the federal executive authorities was reduced during 1998 by about 79,000 or 19 percent, and additional reductions in employment have also been seen in transport, education, and health care. We will continue progress in these areas in 1999. As a first step we have prepared an analysis of the impact of the expenditure reduction plan in 1998, and a programme for continued expenditure rationalization in 1999. This programme includes substantial further reductions of 41,000, or 12 percent, in the number of public employees. In addition the government will take steps to control the off-budget assets of budgetary institutions; undertake an audit and reduction in the number of federal programmes; complete the registry of federal government real estate; and introduce norms for assessing social programmes. A new federal commission has been established to examine options for further streamlining the civil service, and it is anticipated that this will result in a further reduction in the number of federal agencies. The government is committed as well to conducting a public expenditure review during 1999, covering at least the health and education sector

Martina Ritter

From Soviet Society to Civil Society?

For almost ten years now a process of transformation has been taking place in post-Soviet Russia that involves all spheres of society. The sudden breakdown of the Soviet regime has compelled the political players as well as the population of the country to transform almost up from nothing the attempt to reform a self-contained system into a complete reconstruction (Offe, 1994): The authoritarian political system of a state with a monopolistic party was supposed to be changed into a democracy with all the intricate phases of formulating political demands that are ensured and protected by procedural regulations. A planned economy was to be transformed overnight into a capitalist one. The educational institutions were to be changed to such an extent that they would be capable of meeting the requirements of this economy as well as the necessities of raising political awareness. Not least, interpretive patterns of life, people's long-formed certainties, had to be reappraised as interpretive patterns that corresponded with the conception of oneself as a political person with the right to vote and free mobility in all spheres of society. The new demands required social integration at an entirely

new level: what had previously been considered appropriate and socially correct, albeit somewhat ambivalently, but still for the majority of the population, what regulated people's social existence and also the relation between the individual and the collective, between enterprise and state, all these interpretive models and the acquired patterns of day-to-day life were supposed to be abandoned. A new mind-set of everyday competence apposite to the situation ought to be "invented" and embodied.

The concept of "Civil Society", as referred to in the title of this essay, is the starting point of our reflections so as to describe the process of democratisation. Has Russia changed into a Civil Society?

The Recognition of a Concept and its Implication in Political Events

At the centre of reflection is a concept that enjoyed a remarkable renaissance throughout the eighties and nineties. It relates to the level of politics and social integration in a democratic society. The concept of Civil Society has become a focal category of self-reflection and social utopia in the countries of Central Eastern Europe and Eastern Eu-

rope. In the civil movements in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland the protagonist citizens referred to this concept so as to create some scope for action, which enabled them to wrench away certain small "liberties" from the authoritarian state. Assuming as the starting point their experience that they could not transform the authoritarian state in one grand revolutionary act the main protagonists of these social movements concentrated on smallscale activities of protest and social engineering instead that did not fundamentally threaten the state, but drew a line, a boundary, behind which they could retreat. These defiantly obtained liberties provided scope for discussion circles, associations with ecological and sociopolitical issues, trade union organisations (e.g. the Polish Solidarnosc). These activities of Civil Society were forms of self-expression, they were levelled at voicing criticism of the state and not intended to replace or influence state action. With this concept of "Civil Society" a concept was revived that could be both at the same time, a regulative idea and an ideal: a look at the advanced democracies of the West shows the significance of civil associations for the functioning of democracies. Civil Society denotes places within society that are capable of reconciliation between state institutions and the sheer private interests of each individual. This process in itself is two-faced: on the one hand public interests and proposed political solutions have to be discussed in public debate, legitimised and embodied. In that the protagonists in civil associations discuss these issues

WHAT IS CIVIL SOCIETY?

The democratic-theoretical concept of "Civil Society" has inspired many debates and prompted several analyses despite its lack of clarity: Does "Civil Society" relate to institutions (such as Parliament or Law), debates (for instance in the press or media) or places and areas?

Helmut Dubiel defines "Civil Society" as follows:

"Civil Society is a complex sociological general term, denoting communication practices, discourse rituals and public arenas, in which collective protagonists dispute about the unity and future of their society". (Helmut Dubiel, 1994: 97)

1995 - A SOCIOLOGICAL SEMINAR IN A ST PETERSBURG KITCHEN:

The lecturer who has just written down with black wax crayon on her kitchen tablets the names of American authors is a Russian social scientist. She has gathered a small circle of students that work on projects drawn up at her institute. Working at her institute – the Centre for Independent Social Research and at the same time one of the first independent research institu-

tes in Russia – means working in conditions which are so cramped that there simply is not enough space left for a seminar. Thus, she has to make way and go to a place that has always been a special refuge in Soviet Russia: the Russian kitchen - tiny yet warm and cosy – has always enjoyed a wealth of functions. It is the family centre amidst extremely cramped living conditions, it is the place where not only the cooking is done and meals are eaten, one also debates, works and more often than not spends the night there. The Russian kitchen is also the cradle of Civil Society in Russia. Enjoying as much protection from state intrusions as was



possible, the dissidents of the past decades have sat together in the kitchens, debated their criticism of the state, composed their texts and put them up for discussion. Poems were recited and speeches given – which all followed one vision: a new, different world was to be created. The oppressive confinement of the Soviet state and the permanent attempts to control everything have covered up political and ideological differences at first and created unity among those at the receiving end of oppression. Today, these differences have come into the open and led to a fragmentation of political groups, which has considerably negative consequences for the process of the consolidation of the political sphere. Today, the kitchen still remains a place of focal standing: the numerous small NGOs, which have taken up work in Russia and with minimal funds seek to accomplish their tasks and keep their members financially over water, still sit around the kitchen tables a lot and plan the socially relevant activities.

and problems they devote serious thought to these matters, criticise and vary and modify the proposed solutions, plans and patterns. On the other hand, within the framework of Civil Society problems and themes of private concern are related to issues and questions of public interest and generalised by public, sometimes conflictive, debate and addressed to state institutions as a catalogue of demands and subjects to be tackled, respectively. The basis of Civil Society are precisely those independent associations, groups and social movements that are not facing the pressure of having to comply with regulatory tasks of the state; they, therefore, are free to set about "endless" and associative debate. The moving forces within civil associations have to be persons that are readily endowed with the competences to see through the political scene (at least tendentiously), to make a choice between various possible options, to formulate their own interests and to review as to how far these interests might be legitimately generalised for society as a whole. Civil Society asks great flexibility of its protagonists to recognise or develop issues and come up with strategies of assertion and generalisation. It is equally important for them to muster a high tolerance of frustration in order to be able to hold out the lengthy and conflictive encounters over various subjects and their eventual failure. From this point of view civil associations are also places for their protagonists to learn and internalise the rules of the democratic formulation of demands and of conflict management.

Civil Society, however, at the same time always remains a distant ideal for a functioning democracy as well, for a look at Western democracies also lays bare flaws, breaks, apathy and civic disintegration in view of the democratic process. The appeal of the concept of "Civil Society" for the Eastern European proponents lay and still lies in its ambiguity as both a basis and a utopian ideal of democracy (Dubiel, 1994).

Civil Society in Russia: Reality, Illusion or Utopia?

In the Soviet Union this concept has only recently – from the beginning of the nineties - been more intensively discussed. While in the other Central Eastern and Eastern European countries social movements and civil-rights associations managed to stabilise even under Communist rule, the civil associations in the USSR remained isolated and confined to the private sphere: the authoritarian power of the state core under Soviet rule was too overwhelming as to systematically wrest certain liberties from it with the soft forms of civil protest. It was only on rare occasions and even then more often than not by virtue of various charismatic personalities – Andrej Sacharov, for instance - that protests could be articulated, which would raise public awareness. The manifold activities of the circles of dissidents who met in the Russian kitchens and thereby created a semi-public sphere are to be comprehended, admittedly, as the very beginnings of Civil Society. These efforts to formulate some alternatives at all to the prevailing style of politics must not be underrated. On the other hand, there did not crystallise any predominant stable structures - such as the shadow economy in Hungary, the Freedom Charter movement in Czechoslovakia or Poland's Solidarnosc - that would provide a platform for the formulation of social interests on a lasting basis and at a higher level of organisation. The development of diverse and broadly integrative civil associations did not come about in Russia until the demise of the Soviet Union and was ill starred, therefore, since the state and its integrative mechanisms had collapsed. Civil Society was not so much connected to a certain amount of liberties or a sphere of reconciliation between state and society, it rather turned into a prospective solution for a state failing to provide its citizens

with even the most essential supply. It is not conflictive debate or processes of agreeing upon the issues and alternatives to state directives and regulations that are at the core of Civil Society in the Russian discussion but the question in how far Civil Society helps in keeping together the disintegrating state and providing the atomised individuals with the most basic social benefits (Langenohl, 1996).

Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGO) as a Basis of Civil Development

In spite of the unfavourable preconditions approximately 160.000 different organisations and associations have been founded over the past few years, all of which can be subsumed under the collective term NGO. These are health care centres, educational establishments, legal advice centres, institutions providing help and support for the disabled, neighbourhood welfare services and many other charities and civil organisations that are devoted to the burning issues of providing the population with social welfare, health care and generally the support of social policy. What we can first see from this is that Russia's citizens have enthusiastically responded to the ideas of civil self-organisation and personal commitment. This process, however, has been greatly aided by training programmes and financial support on the part of Western countries viewing confident citizens that are outspoken about their interests and self-help organisations as the basis of Civil Society and as the prerequisite for the successful process of democratisation.

Recent surveys of charities, however, show that only a small proportion of the active members shares this "civic" perspective of democratisation through participation and individual responsibility. Michael Kleinberg (in: Schrader et al) points out that the prime motivation for and the eventual frame of the initia-

tives take on a somewhat different complexion in most cases. Only very few organisations develop and establish democratic procedures regulating the process of decision making and the allocation of leading posts, actually set them down in the statutes and pay heed to them. Mostly - according to Kleinberg's summary in his empirical study of St Petersburg charities - the members of an initiative are not involved in the decision making process but seen as mere executive agents. This does not exactly promote practising individual responsibility and the articulation of one's own interests; instead, patterns of subordination and "provision from above" are reenacted time after time. Kleinberg sees another grave problem in the self-conception of the organisations as substitutions for state failure. In view of the breakdown of social welfare benefits the protagonists see their work as a stopgap that can temporarily guarantee what actually ought to be provided by the state in the first place. The last critical point of Kleinberg's survey that I should like to refer to also fits into this context: the tight situation on the labour market results in the fact that the contribution to the civil organisations is built up into a professional alternative rather than viewed against the background of citizen participation. Also, the work of these initiatives generally tends to be considerably influenced by criteria of economic success, as seen from the standpoint of business management. This orientation remains understandable from the perspective of the protagonists in the face of the disastrous economic situation of the population, it does, however, produce negative consequences for the development of the ideas of participation and individual responsibility. An essential potential of civil activities is, therefore, almost dragged out of the way: the main protagonists are not having controversial debates according to democratic rules with the object to integrate a host of

LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ARE EXTREMELY CONTRADICTORY



Those belonging to the numerically small new middle class take a stroll on the famous Newskij Prospekt in St Petersburg, passing along their way the expensive designer shops that have moved to the centre of the chief city in northern Russia. The slope within one city, however, is immense. A few streets further away St Petersburg takes on a different complexion: dilapidated buildings, impassable roads and a tram driver that has to climb out of the car to set the points herself with sheer physical strength. Although car sales have boomed in Russia in recent years large parts of the population use public transport to go about their daily business, doing some shopping or plainly going to work. The buses and trams, however, have also been hit by the collapse of the economy. The coaches and carriages are run-down and in a state of

disrepair, mostly unheated and always packed with people. Actually running buses, trains or tramways have become few and far between and those having to rely on public transport by now have to put up with delays and waiting times of two and more hours in order to reach work from their homes – mostly in one of the "sleeping towns" that make up the real St Petersburg. The wages are so low that public transport alone devours a large portion of the money. When people have finally arrived at the offices or factories where they work they are exhausted from the adversities of the long and arduous journey there. The daily grind of life in Russia wears people out and leaves them with little strength to envision a different life and actually do something about it.



different opinions and produce normative ideas of sensible and apposite orientations in view of taking action. Instead, the substitution of state benefits and economic efficiency from the perspective of business management are to the fore of the orientations.

Civil Society and Patterns of Life

The abovementioned critical situation of the Non-Governmental-Organisations hints at a crucial problem in the process of the evolution of Civil Society: the core of Civil Society consists of forms of communication and self-reflection that either have to be contributed or acquired from scratch by the members of the initiatives and organisations. If we take as our starting point the assumption that living and lasting democracies can only exist if the citizens are capable of participating in decision making, in the formulation and development of questions and solutions, then demands are made in particular on people and their competences as "responsible citizens". Civil Society cannot be established by passing legislation, nor can it be translated into reality through pedagogic steps. The experiences of recent years in the Western welfare states as well as in the process of the transformation of authoritarian regimes have told that the sole task of the state lies in providing enough scope for liberty to be utilised by the individuals themselves. Civil Society needs responsible citizens and people develop into responsible citizens in a Civil Society - one could describe this as the particular predicament of Civil Society: to presuppose what still has to be created within. In so far Civil Society represents an ideal and a regulative idea at the same time and denotes an intricate and complex interactive context in modern societies. From this perspective, the individuals are at the focus of our attention just as much as the selfhelp organisations that have been highlighted above. At the beginning of this text I have already indicated the kind of idea of the individual that is implicit in the concept of Civil Society: flexibility, the will to and the competence of reflection, frustration tolerance, individual

responsibility and the orientation towards norms of equality and equal rights are the keywords, which describe "responsible" citizens.

Today, life in Russia is characterised by the financial collapse of the state, the poverty of broad sections of the population, unemployment and under-supply with regard to education and health care. Obviously, these are hardly the ideal circumstances to concern oneself with the issues of equality, human rights and political participation. The process of democratisation has also somewhat gone out of kilter and, as a result, corruption thrives in both the political and the economic sphere, which naturally adds to people's turning away from the ideas of democracy and Civil Society. They have witnessed the collapse of their society in the name of "democratisation and privatisation". The attitude of the population towards politics and public issues is characterised nowadays by apathy and their turning away from it all.

For our question it is essential which interpretive models the individuals employ to read and understand the experiences of these "democratisations". They still adhere to the interpretive patterns provided by political and everyday culture in the Soviet Union. Apart from the failure of the "democrats" in the process of transformation the main reasons for this turning away from politics, in my opinion, seem to be rooted in many ways in the cultural traditions of the Soviet Union, which do not simply cease to exert considerable influence now that the former regime has collapsed. Instead, we might even rightly assume that the failure of the process of democratisation hitherto enhances the effect and influence of the old interpretive patterns. I should like to broach but two aspects that dominated patterns of life and the political culture of the Soviet population: the significance of the private sphere (1) and the general perception and comprehension of politics (2).

(1): The situation of the population in the authoritarian state was characterised by a specific dynamics of official politics and privacy. The object of the authoritarian monopolistic party was to control and predetermine all domains of social life. All activities in both the economic and the political sphere as well as in the lives of the citizens were meant to revolve around the one, grand goal – building a Communist society. Thus, there were at least tendentiously – no spheres independent of intrusions on the part of the monopolistic party that could be filled by the individuals. Inscrutable bureaucratic rules and regulations and the adroit forging of private bonds, which, however, could at any given time be restricted or even undone through external events that were neither influenceable nor foreseeable, dominated the situation. Under Brezhnev people have already begun to counter this regulatory frenzy of the state by their retreat to the private sphere, it was precisely because the outside world could scarcely be formed and shaped according to individual abilities and a rational, comprehensible set of rules that the private sphere became the main field of protection from the state and of self-appraisal as an estimable subject. This "supercharging" of the private sphere, in turn, entailed a mode of complete stagnation with regard to the private life: every change, each new formulation of desires, goals and problems in the private sphere held the risk of undermining the protective functions of privacy by internal conflicts. Since the state aspired to regulate all and sundry, its subjects sought to create a field of continuity and security. Immobility and inflexibility are much more the distinguishing marks of the private sphere than experimenting with new forms or giving full, albeit conflictive, expression to one's desires and alternative ideas. Now, if Civil Society is primarily dependent on people and their respective patterns of life and the po-

tentials these may, or may not, hold, then the cumbersome development of Civil Society in Russia can also be connected to this "ossification", as it were, of the private sphere. The breakdown of their world, the high costs of a problematic privatisation and economic reconstruction, the absence of legal certainty and the loss of a binding moral code once again thrust people back to the safety of their private world: when everything around them falls apart they clutch to the last remaining straw of continuity and certainty in their world all the more desperately and, quite explicably, shrink from the risk of developing creative fantasy and calling into question their ways of life and the respective interpretive patterns.

This rigidity in the private sphere also dominates some elements of the perception of politics in Russia today. To the end of my article I should like to broach the second abovementioned aspect and discuss the perception and comprehension of politics on the basis of the result of the parliamentary elections (State Duma elections) held in December 1999.

(2) One of the essential elements of social integration in the Soviet Union was the moralisation of each and every event and of individual action alike: all activities, either economic or public, private concerns and ideas were supposed to relate to the building of the Communist society, to planning the Communist collectives and shaping the homo Sovieticus – the prototype of the Soviet citizen. In the patterns of Soviet reasoning, therefore, there were not any activities that could not be examined in terms of moral criteria. Individual interests. effusive lusts and desires that went beyond the scope of the normative horizon could not find a legitimate place within this construction. This binding moral construction was considered an ideal also and, especially, for politics. At the same time, however, people learned by experience that those in power never guite heeded this ideal, to which everybody was supposed to submit him or herself. From the very beginning the policy of the Communist Party was characterised by a three-sided difference: first, there was the action claimed to have been taken, second, the interests standing behind it and third, what actually happened in reality (Holzer 1998). Each political move was meant to be morally pure but, in reality, it was always subordinated at the same time to the monopolistic party's ambitions to retain absolute power. What was eventually translated into reality more often than not could not even match the officially issued version, let alone truly reflect the political interests of those at the helms of power. Thus, the paradox image was created that truly good politics ought to satisfy the highest moral standards, whereas at the same time each policy was automatically "dirty" from the very beginning, owing to the interests standing behind it.

No-one was capable of satisfying the Soviet ideal of purity, neither the population when going about the day-to-day realities of life nor those in power who came up with ever new explanations for their apparent failures. Moreover, the Communist Party has always flanked its policies by spurious democratic mechanisms - elections, debating clubs, public parades and discussions - so that today's democratic mechanisms such as elections, debate and participation seem strikingly familiar and very doubtful, as far as their effectiveness goes. True, the population largely turns up on election days and political events are permanently debated, but in the end the activities of the politicians seem to the Russians out of touch with the real world, Parliament a crowd of windbags, party programmes products of sheer imagination and the procedures of legitimation vastly ineffective. The effective democratic dynamics of party interests, functional relevance of the political institutions, personal power instincts, normative positions on and ideas pertaining to public interests that is governed and channelled solely through procedural regulations seems inscrutable, arbitrary and "dirty" in the face of this interpretive pattern.

The Soviet paradox of purity and consistent human failure in politics apparently leads to a repudiation of politics as a whole: since every policy is dirty none can genuinely tackle the host of problems. A solution for this problematic interpretation of politics is provided by the orientation towards one person alone that does not stand out for political programmes, statements and connections with others but appears assertive, independent, intelligent, prudent and powerful. The prudence of such a figure would lie - as we can confidently assume - in that this person would not be influenced by programmatic politicians but summon a round of experts who might come up with a solution for the problems.

The duma elections of December 1999 have yielded the somewhat surprising result that large parts of the Russian population voted for a virtual party. The Edenstvo/ Medved Party had only been founded some three months before the elections were held; it has yet to present any programme whatsoever, it does not have – for it only exists on paper after all – internal structures, there are no clearly defined, comprehensible internal party rules regulating the formulation of demands, no such procedures, no party committee that could issue statements. Edenstvo has apparently been voted for because Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister and currently the President of Russia, has declared Edenstvo his party. Putin, who initially was not given much of a chance, owing to his nondescript appearance and lack of overall presence, has succeeded in persuading the Russian people of his qualities: as a successful military commander who does not waste time on the tedious business of consensual conflict management or the policy of taking one step at a time, but who apparently sets out to settle things in one great act of liberation. In view of the confused state of civil activities and the lengthy democratic procedures of the legitimation and shaping of politics, which are very demanding indeed, a politician that advocates proud solutions beyond the scale of political programmes seems to be a promise for a successful future. The popularity of both President Putin and the war against Chechnya are indications, in my view, of an isolation of Russian society. The democrats with their programmes, ideas of human rights and individual rights, freedom of the Press and freedom of speech - for instance the Liberal Party Jabloko under Grigorij Javlinskij - have done worse than ever before for a variety of reasons: one of the reasons is that Jabloko has voiced, albeit cautious, criticism of the war in Chechnya and stood by the civil ideas of human rights, participation and equality. This perspective sheds a rather dim light on our initial question: Has Russia changed into a Civil Society? In spite of the diverse civil activities, numerous efforts to raise political awareness and create a more political public sphere Russia appears to have decided in favour of a less complex way for the time being. President Putin's main asset seems to be his promise to steer the country's fate with an iron hand and to release the population from political struggle, debate and conflict.

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ON THE RESEARCH PROJECT:

The reflections on daily life and political culture in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia presented in the text above are based on the results of the research project "The Development of Privacy and Public Sphere and Gender Relations in Transitional Russia", which was organised and carried through at the University of Gießen in cooperation with two Russian research institutes (Centre for Independent Social Research, St Petersburg and Institute for Humanities and Political Studies, Moscow). Within the context of this project socio-historical studies were pursued and biographical interviews were done in various Russian towns. In one part of the project expert interviews on several questions of Civil Society were conducted with parliamentary representatives of the democratic opposition (the Jabloko Party) in the State Duma.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND GENDER POLICY:

The development of Civil Society in the Western world has "provided" civil and constitutional rights for each individual. At the same time, however, it also produced social inequality and injustice as well as specific social hierarchies. A hallmark, as it were, of the democratisation of the Western world was the exclusion of women from precisely these civil and constitutional rights up until into the 20th century. This exclusion occurred through explicit legal regulations on the one hand (e.g. the right to vote, the right of education, marriage law, family law) and through indirect legal requirements (e.g. tax law, law of inheritance), ethic rules and cultural interpretive patterns on the other. Only the severe encounters and struggles, which were instigated by women's movements at the turn of the century, safeguarded women's rights of political participation, for instance. The second women's movement has been fighting for cultural changes now since the nineteen seventies. A basic problem of Western democracies is the split of society between a private sphere and a public-political sphere and the attribution of the genders to these spheres. The argument that each person is endowed with certain rights by virtue of nature has been specifically utilised in view of social engineering: nature – such is the assumption – has endowed men and women, respectively, with specific features that can be socially utilised: men were conceptualised as rational, dominant, receptive to thought and autonomous and thus conformed with the image of the new individual shaping politics and society. Women on the other hand were credited with the traits of emotionality, softness, motherliness and subordination. The idea of characteristic traits is an "invention" of modernity and embodied the specific division of the spheres in Western democracies. It is with great difficulty only that the recognition prevails that "modern" gender relations, too, have been created historically and culturally and are by no means natural. Thus, it becomes clear: it could also be different.

The Russian situation today displays a variant of the abovementioned gender relation, which is based primarily on the legacy of the Soviet Union. The political culture of the USSR with regard to issues of gender policy was characterised by an ideologically motivated equality and the legal implementation, tendentiously, of equal rights of both genders. The participation of women in the political process was regulated by requirements that women be adequately represented. In addition to that the principal notion was that women ought to participate in gainful employment in exactly the same manner as men, which was at least formally accomplished with an employment rate among women of roughly 90 per cent. What goes for politics, however, as well as for gainful employment in general is that women were nowhere to be found in higher, influential and politically relevant positions. The gender relation was entirely hierarchical in this respect. Everyday culture

was shaped by the fact that women were integrated into the working life, but men, in turn, made little, if any, contribution to family work or private activities. This was a woman's job. The responsibility of the women for running family life and actively organising relationships was backed up with biologistic interpretive patterns: biological motherliness was equated with social motherliness and greatly valued in terms of party ideology since Stalin.

This paradox situation forms the background to the current, new situation. The ideas that are constitutively linked with Civil Society in the West, the rigid separation of public sphere and privacy as well as the attribution of the genders to social spheres by virtue of natural preconditions, has considerable impact on Russia, in particular with regard to the hierarchy of gender relations: economically, the women are the first to lose out on account of the process of capitalisation: on the one hand because they were truly over-represented in the social professions (medical care and educational institutions, child care and geriatric nursing) and are, therefore, particularly affected by state bankruptcy. On the other hand, it turns out that the idea of quite naturally being in gainful employment was not so deeply embodied after all in the mind-set of the "homo Sovieticus". The new entrepreneurs, bosses and leading managers undoubtedly regard the men as the family heads and providers, which means that in cases of doubt women are more likely to be dismissed than men.

The already existing biologistic interpretive patterns with regard to shaping gender relations are linked with the interpretive patterns connected to democratisation and capitalisation, which relate the genders to a certain set of natural endowments, i.e. rationality = male and emotionality = female, and form a specific mixture: women are seen as both, strong, all-embracing mothers on the one hand and weak, subordinate women on the other. What is more, the Soviet citizens have experienced a dominant state that was tendentiously unwilling to leave them any privacy at all. The private sphere has been and still is an extremely treasured place where nowadays a life free of state intrusions can be led, much to the delight of people in Russia. The privatisation of society that goes hand in hand with Civil Society – if it is to develop in Russia – has the consequence for women that the old gender relation is cemented in the private sphere and the parallel, contrary interpretive patterns of gainful employment are broken down. The Communist ideal of women's emancipation is often interpreted today as artificial and unnatural, as imposed upon people. The idea of a natural gender relation, connected to the emergence of civil, democratic societies, now appears to be a change for a better life. Thus, Civil Society at first holds large potential for conflict and entails losses for the women in this respect, but at the same time it also introduces its principal ideas of human rights, equality before the law and multiple possibilities of free development and, therefore, provides an opportunity in the private sphere, as well, to judge general circumstances by these standards, voice criticism – and initiate changes.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE ON RUSSIAN HISTORY:

 5.2. Mikhail Corbatchen pushes through his plans for extensive reform at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soried Union. 1.2.7. Bor's Veltsin quits the Communist Party of the Soried Union. 1.4.8. Corbatchen elected President of the USSR in a secret ballo by the Congress of People's Deputies. 1.2.7. Bor's Veltsin quits the Communist Party of the Soried Union. 1.4.8. Corbatchen signs the Decree on the Rehabilitation of the Victims of Stalinism. 1.9.10. The Supreme Soried passes a bill that permits entrepreneurs to lease land, buildings, factories and facilities from the state. Malla Summit: President Corbatchen and his American counterpart Plush declars the Cold War oner. 2.1.2. The Congress of People's Deputies approves the private land ournership bill. 1.9.3. Hundreds of thousands are on the strests in Moscour and other cities, demonstrating for the President of the RSFSR. Veltsin, who declares ware no Corbatcher and the Chinon goneomment. 2.4. Drastic increases in the prices of food and consumer poods come into force in the USSR. 1.7.5. President Corbatches signs a decree, hamming strikes in the kay cares of the energy sector. 1.9.8. Coug d'etin in the USSR. While President Gorbatchen is isolated on the Crimom Parinsula, an "Emergency Committoe" under Vice President Corbatchen is solated on the Crimoma Parinsula, an "Emergency Committoe" under Vice President Corbation programme for the transition to market economy in the RSFSR. 2.9.10. President Yelds in public squares the independence on the the transition to market economy in the RSFSR. Yeldsin, antonduces are those on the stress of Nonied 1 and parinter. The Congress of Progle's Deputies approach the Gone of the Stress of the Commusit Party of the Stress of the onergine of the commits of the Paris of the Commusit Party of the Stress of the Commusit Part	1990	
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- 27.10. - 12.12.	The president's decree on land reform lays the legal foundation for the decollectivisation of the agrarian sector. Parliamentary elections.
12,12,	Block Russia, led by Iegor Gaidar, becomes the strongest party with 96 of 443 seats.
1994	Referendum on a new constitution, a majority is in favour of the changes.
- 1.1.	The compulsory deliveries of agrarian products to the state are abolished. Victor Chernomyrdin stays in office as Prime Minister.
- 23.2.	The State Duma (252 votes for, 67 against) decides on an amnesty for the putschists of 1991 and 1993. Ruzkoj becomes the Chairman of the newly founded Social Democratic People's Party and calls for the resto- ration of Russia as a super power on the territory of the USSR.
- 13.4	Signing of a basic agreement between Belarus and the Russian Federation on the creation of a monetary
- 20.4.	union. The IMF grants a 1,5 billion-dollar credit, inflation, in turn, is to be reduced.
- 22.4.	Decree by the President on the start of the second phase of the privatisation of state enterprises.
- 26.4.	Cooperation and Partnership Treaty with the EU.
- 11.12.	The war in Chechnya begins after Russian troops of the Ministry of the Interior and the Defence Ministry invade Chechnya.
1995	
- 1.2.	Decree on the procedures governing the realisation of the rights of owners of plots of land as well as ownership shares: former members of the sovkhozes and kolkhozes, which have been turned into joint-stock companies, will only writing their share of the land if all former members appeared.
- 17.12.	will only retain their share of the land if all former members consent. State Duma elections, the Communists become the strongest party.
1996	
- 28.2.	Admission of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe.
<i>- 15.3</i> .	Following a motion by the Communists the State Duma passes a resolution that declares the termination of the Union Treaty of 1922 by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR 1991 void.
- 16.6.	The State Duma ratifies the Treaty on the formation of the Commonwealth of Sovereign Republics. Presidential elections, no candidate gains the absolute majority of the votes.
- 10.0. - 3.7.	Deciding round of the elections, Yeltsin wins against the leader of the Communist Party, Gennadij Sjuganov,
	reaching 53,8% of the votes.
	Chernomyrdin is confirmed as Prime Minister by the State Duma.
	The reshuffling of the government regarding the important posts for economic issues is completed.
<u> </u>	The reformer Vladimir Potanin is responsible for the entire economic and financial policy as well as for pri- vatisation, Yeltsin's chief political advisor, Victor Iljushin, is responsible for social policy.
<i>- 23.8</i> .	Ceasefire in Chechnya between Yeltsin's security advisor, Alexander Lebed, and Aslan Mashadov. From June 1996 until February 1997 Yeltsin can only perform presidential duties to a limited extent due to his bad health.
	The main problems are the chaotic state of financial affairs, high payment arrears with regard to wages, salaries and pensions.
	Strikes and demonstrations throughout the country.
1997	
- 5.1.	The withdrawal of the troops of the Ministry of the Interior and the Defence Ministry is completed. Presidential elections in Chechnya bring a victory for the head of the transitional government, Aslan Masha- dov. The government is reshuffled in March, Anatolij Tchubais, head of the Presidential Administration and reformer, becomes Minister of Finance and one of the Deputy Prime Ministers and is responsible for social affairs, communal affairs and housing and is to carry out restructuring of the monopolistic concerns in the oil and electricity business as well as the railway.
- 12.5.	President Yeltsin and President Mashadov sign a peace treaty in Moscow, which is to end the four centuries old confrontation between Russians and Chechnyans.
	The extension of credits agreed upon by the creditor banks, which are joined together in the London Club, comes into force in December.
1998	
- 1.1.	The nominal value of the rouble is reduced (1000 roubles are one new rouble).
- <i>23.3</i> .	Yeltsin dismisses Prime Minister Chernomyrdin from office and entrusts Sergey Kirijenko with the forming of a new government.
- 24.4.	The State Duma confirms Kirijenko, an independent candidate. Impeachment proceedings are opened against President Yeltsin, he is accused of breach of the constitution in connection with the dissolution of the USSR, the coup d'état, the disbandment of the democratically not
	legitimised Supreme Soviet (1993) and the subsequent storming of the White House, genocide in Chechnya (1994–1996) as well as high treason in connection with the reduction of the armed forces. Increase of tax debts and of wage payment arrears.
	Demonstrations and strikes, railway blockades.
	The rouble is under great pressure of devaluation, the Russian Central Bank intervenes with support purchases

	and raises the interest rates.
July	The mortal remains of Tsar Nicholas II. and his family are laid to rest in St Petersburg, eighty years after their assassination.
- 17.8.	Financial crisis, factual insolvency, devaluation of the rouble. As to prevent the flight of capital the convertibility of the rouble is limited, ninety-day debt moratorium.
- 23.8.	President Yeltsin surprisingly dismisses the Kirijenko government in the wake of the crisis. Victor Chernomyrdin becomes caretaker Prime Minister.
11.0	After the Duma refuses a confirmation, Yeltsin nominates Foreign Minister Jevgenij Primakov.
- 11.9.	The State Duma confirms Primakov as Prime Minister. Continuation of the reform policy, but precedence of social aspects over a monetary policy that is strictly geared towards reducing the inflation rate.
- 7.10.	Demonstrations throughout the country against the economic and social misery.
1999	
<i>- 19.5</i> .	The state duma confirms Sergej Stepashin as Prime Minister.
- 16.8.	Vladimir Putin becomes Prime Minister.
	<i>He promises order, discipline and the strengthening of the country's defensive capacities as well as free and fair elections.</i>
September	A series of bomb attacks shakes Moscow and claims roughly 300 lives. Chechnyans are accused of these assaults, even though there is no evidence.
	Another war breaks out in Chechnya. Russian troops of the Ministry of the Interior and the Defence Ministry, which are supported by Chechnyan militias loyal to Moscow, set about crushing the "Chechnyan rebellion".
- <i>19.12</i> .	State Duma elections.
2000	
	After the capture of the capital Grosnyj, which by now is in ruins, by Russian troops, President Mashadov's guerrillas retreat to the mountains and continue their partisan war.
- April	Presidential elections: Vladimir Putin elected President.
	Mikhail Kasjanov becomes new Prime Minister.

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The Council of Europe's Contribution to the Reform of History Teaching in the Russian Federation and the Succession States of the Former Soviet Union

Introduction

The Council of Europe was set up in 1949 in Strasbourg with a small number of Western European member states. In the early years, history and history teaching occupied a special place in the work of the organisation. The founders had seen how history had been used for the wrong reasons, and the Council stated clearly at the beginning that the purpose of its work on history textbooks and history teaching was "not to use history as propaganda for European unity but to try to eliminate the traditional mistakes and prejudices and to establish the facts".

In the 1950s and 60s, a lot of work was done on history textbooks by the Council of Europe in an attempt to encourage the member states to improve the contents of the books and develop a new image of history and history teaching. One of the results of this work, was the recommendation by the Council of Europe's Council for Cultural Cooperation on the creation of a European Centre for the Improvement of History and Geography Textbooks. The International School Book Institute of Braunschweig accepted and later became the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, retaining its close links with the Council of Europe.

During the 1970s and 80s, the Council of Europe devoted its work to curriculum development and establishing links between history teaching and other areas of the curriculum. History became a subject of burning importance to the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe and the Council of Europe at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since 1989, therefore, the Council of Europe has become a truly pan-European organisation and works with 21 new partner countries in Central and Eastern Europe.-

The Council of Europe's Council for Cultural Cooperation gradually began to count among its new signatories many of the East European countries, the former Soviet Republics and the Republics of the former Yugoslavia. They were all beginning to look at what was taught about history, a subject which had been used for ideological purposes for many years. The Ministries of Education wished to reform their history standards and curricula, produce new textbooks and provide initial and in-service training for history teachers encouraging them to teach history in the new political and economic context and using new teaching methods.

"History teaching in the New Europe"

In this context, and in response to the First Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe's Member States (Vienna, 1993), the organisation's Education Department began new and innovatory work on history teaching within the framework of a two-year Project "History teaching in the New Europe". The main aims of the Project were to:

- identify innovatory approaches to the teaching of the history of Europe in the spirit of the final Declaration of the Vienna Summit, in particular the urgent need to strengthen "programmes aimed at eliminating prejudice in the teaching of history by emphasising positive mutual influences between different countries, religions and ideas in the historical development of Europe";
- provide policy makers, curriculum developers and history teachers with practical advice.

A series of symposia and meetings of experts was organised and the Project culminated in a Symposium on "Mutual Understanding and the Teaching of European History: Challenges, Problems and Approaches" (Prague, Czech Republic, 24-28 October 1995). The discussions centred on the following questions:

- how to ensure that national history does not become nationalistic history;
- the balance and links between local, regional, national, European and world history in our curricula;
- what effective approaches could be found for teaching about controversial, sensitive and tragic issues in the shared histories of Europe, and how teachers could be helped to handle such issues;
- whether or not the history curricula have a fully European dimension, and, in particular, whether the history of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are reflected in history curricula in other parts of the continent;
- the contribution of history outside the classroom to greater mutual understanding and confidence in Europe, e.g. history clubs in schools, museums, field work, school links and exchanges, and the mass media.



Maitland Stobart, former director of the Education Department of the Council of Europe and one of the initiators of the Projects on history teaching in Europe in discussion with the author and Maria Luisa de Bivar Black in Ekaterinburg, April 1998. Foto by Alois Ecker

was extended to include Armenia, Azerbaïjan and Georgia.

In 1997, the Programme continued with a regional seminar on "The reform of history teaching in secondary schools" (Tbilisi, Georgia, September 1997) and a Regional Carpathian Seminar on "Central and Eastern Europe as a historical region: the problem of integration in 20th Century world history" (Chernivtsy, Ukraine, October 1997) as well as a multilateral seminar on "The initial and in-service training of history teachers in European countries in democratic transition" (Lviv, Ukraine, June 1997).

Some of the results of these seminars were incorporated into the history curricula of the countries

The Secretary General's New Initiative

In May 1995, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Mr Daniel TARSCHYS, put forward a set of proposals concerning programmes of cooperation aimed particularly at the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States to the Committee of Ministers. These proposals were placed under the title "The Secretary General's New Initiative" and they included a Programme of Activities relating to History and Civic Education.

The Programme of Activities relating to History took, as its inspiration, the Vienna Declaration and following that the texts adopted at the 19th Session of the Standing Conference of the European Ministers of Education (Kristiansand, Norway, June 1997) where the Ministers stated that good history teaching can make a significant contribution to the process of democratic transition by helping all young people to:

 learn about their historical heritage as well as that of other peoples and nations;

- acquire and practise such key skills as the ability to think for themselves, the ability to handle and analyse critically different forms of information, and the ability not to be swayed by biased information and irrational arguments;
- develop such basic attitudes as intellectual honesty and rigour, independent judgement, open-mindedness, curiosity, civil courage, and tolerance.

The work on the reform of history teaching and the preparation of new history textbooks had begun in earnest at the beginning of 1996 through a series of national seminars in Albania, Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine and a multilateral Seminar on "The preparation and publication of new history

textbooks in European countries in democratic transition" in Warsaw in November. From then on, the work on the reform of history teaching



The author with Edward Roussel, the governor of the Sverdlovsk region, at the seminar in Ekaterinburg, April 1998. Foto by Alison Cardwell

in which we were working that were being revised at the time. In particular, this is the case of Ukraine following the Chernivtsy Seminar where the Ukrainian authorities also increased the number of hours devoted to history teaching because of the recommendations of that Seminar.

This work continued until the end of the Secretary General's New Initiative in December 1998. There were, and continue to be, two specific features of the activities that were carried out in all the countries that were involved. One was the fact that the work included the generous participation of Austria's Kultur-Kontakt, as well as that of three key non-governmental organisations involved in history education in one way or another:

- the European Standing Conference of History Teachers' Associations – EUROCLIO;
- the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research;
- the European Educational Publishers' Group.

The other specific feature of this work was that, wherever possible, seminars were organised outside the capital cities of the countries concerned. In Ukraine, seminars were organised in Chernivtsy and Lviv, and, in 1998, seminars were organised in Yalta and Chernigiv. The same applied to the Russian Federation where seminars, in 1998, were organised in Ekaterinburg, Perm, Arkhangelsk and Khabarovsk.

Activities for the Development and Consolidation of Democratic Security

1. The Russian Federation

At the beginning of 1999, a new Programme started within the framework of the Activities for the Development and Consolidation of Democratic Stability (ADACS) and the work on history took on a new dimension with a focus on activities in the Russian Federation related to: curricula and standards in history teaching;

the preparation and publication of new history textbooks;

the initial and in-service training of history teachers.

This new Programme of Activities was launched at the Second National Stocktaking Conference (St Petersburg, March 1999) organised by the Council of Europe, Austria's KulturKontakt and the International Center for Educational Innovation at the Herzen State Pedagogical University. The Conference brought together history educators from throughout the Russian Federation to:

- review the work carried out since the First National Stocktaking Conference (Suzdal, December 1997);
- prepare the new two year programme of activities on history, "Teaching history in the 21st Century".

The participants all agreed that much had been accomplished during the two years and that the results were now being included in the day to day work of those history educators with whom the work had been carried out. Also, a support network was being created through regional history teachers' associations.

It can be said that the participation of speakers invited by the Council of Europe together with Russian speakers on the three topics has contributed greatly to the trust that has been developed in the work. Also, three Russian history educators - each responsible for one of the topics - are working with the Council of Europe to prepare the seminars in 2000 in order to further the work and to produce clear conclusions and recommendations to be addressed to the Russian Authorities: the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation and the State Duma which is responsible for the adoption of the standards on history teaching.

The way in which the work is done is through partnership. It is true to

say that the representatives of the Council of Europe and the speakers invited by the Council of Europe to take part in the work return greatly enriched by their experience and often apply what they have learnt in their working lives. It has always been stressed that the work is carried out in a two-way process. It is truly a learning and sharing experience.

Curricula and standards

In the Russian Federation, the curricula and standards in history teaching are very important because they regulate all the history education throughout the Russian Federation and are adopted by the Duma – the Parliament of the Russian Federation. Our contribution to the preparation of the standards is such, thanks in large part to the speakers with whom we have been working – that we are now involved as equal partners in the work to bring them to the Duma for adoption.

We continued to work on the question of standards in history teaching in Irkutsk in September 1999 in order to refine further what should be included but also how to introduce a regional component to the standards. It is of interest to note that, in Khabarovsk in the Far Eastern part of the Russian Federation, the history of the Asia Pacific Rim is almost as important as that of Europe. It is, therefore, of vital importance that the regional specificities should not be forgotten.

The preparation and publication of new history textbooks

We have been working on this topic since the Multilateral Seminar on "The preparation and publication of history textbooks in European countries in democratic transition" (Warsaw, November 1997). At that time, all the countries with which we were working were in the process of preparing new history textbooks. The old history textbooks of all the



Oksana Karlina, Historia. Ukrainian textbook for the seventh form, Kiev 1997. One of the new history textbooks which had been initiated by a seminar on textbooks in the framework of the project.

countries in transition were, corresponding to the narrative concept of history in those countries , books of texts with little or nothing in the way of illustrations, maps, sources tests or tasks. The textbooks in the Russian Federation were no different.

Since that time, it has been fascinating to see how the new generations of history textbooks are evolving. The teams of textbook authors now more often include teachers, who contribute with their expertise as users in the development of the textbooks. The textbooks are not any more the only purveyor of information in the classroom. They are now similar to textbooks in Western Europe and they include sources, maps and proposals for pupil centred activities in the classroom. It has been a great privilege to be involved in an advisory capacity in the preparation of new textbooks on world history by the prestigious Russian educational publishers, Prosveschenive. These textbooks were changed to take into account the comments and recommendations of the Council of Europe specialists. We were also involved in the publication of the first textbook on the history of the Novgorod region. Again, the comments and recommendations made by the Council of Europe specialists were incorporated into the textbook.

The initial and in-service training of history teachers

During the early stages of the work on the reform of history teaching and the preparation of new history textbooks, it became apparent that it was important to look at the initial and in-service training of history teachers. This initial look was carried

out at a Multilateral Seminar on "The initial and in-service training of history teachers in European countries in democratic transition" (Lviv, Ukraine, June 1997).

Since then, initial and in-service-training of history teachers has become a significant topic of interest in seminars we have organised in co-operation with the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation in Novgorod (November 1997), Ekaterinburg (April 1998), St Petersburg (March 1999), Kazan (April 1999), Nijnij Novgorod (April 1999) and Wolgograd (June 2000).

In the Russian Federation, thanks to the generous participation of Austria's KulturKontakt, we have been able to discuss the ideal profile of a history teacher and also to look at initial and in-service training to attain this. We have also begun discussing the different components in initial training, new methods of history teaching and history tea-



Lenin with children – a rare form of the otherwise very popular statues of Lenin all over the Russian Federation. Garden of a resthouse, Odessa, May 2000. Foto by Alison Cardwell

cher training, and who the trainers are and how they are trained. We have also begun work on teacher appraisal, how this is done and by whom.

Teachers are the single most important resource in the classroom and they deserve all the help and support that they can get, particularly at this time of economic austerity in the Russian Federation. Many teachers find themselves in a precarious situation with a low standard of living. Many of them also live in rural areas where they are not only teachers but have to look after the social needs of their pupils. The Russian authorities are very concerned about these teachers and, as far as possible, we always include teachers from rural areas in our seminars.

2. Other initiatives on history

In addition to the present work being carried out in the Russian Federation, the Council of Europe's Education Department is also implementing two multilateral/regional initiatives:

- "The Tbilisi Initiative";
- the Black Sea Initiative on History.

"The Tbilisi Initiative"

"The Tbilisi Initiative" is the preparation and publication of a Caucasian history textbook for use in secondary schools is Armenia, Azerbaïjan, Georgia and the Russian Federation. It will not replace the national textbooks but will be a supplement to them. The aim is to bring historians and ministry officials from each of the four countries involved round the table to discuss different and difficult aspects of their shared histories as well as their similarities. The textbook aims to teach secondary school pupils about their neighbouring countries in a spirit of tolerance and openness.

The Initiative will not only involve the preparation of the textbook itself

but it will also involve the training of teachers in how to teach controversial and sensitive issues and use new teaching methods. The textbook should be published in the four national languages and English because it will also be a useful reference book on the histories and cultures of this not very well known region with its wonderful histories and cultural heritage. The textbook itself should be innovatory and written in a language that is acceptable to all. It should have a balance between texts, photos, maps, sources, tests and tasks for pupils.

The work is progressing and the textbook is beginning to take shape. The teams of authors have prepared and revised their parts on the national histories of their countries, and are now beginning work on the thematic section. The first version of the Introduction has been prepared by an independent expert and will be revised in the light of the discussions with the teams of authors.

The Council of Europe and the Ministries of Education of the countries involved are continuing the series of seminars related to the teaching of controversial and sensitive issues in history teaching in the four countries involved with a view to training teachers to use this new textbook.

The Turkish Authorities have expressed a strong wish to be incorporated into "The Tbilisi Initiative" and this will be done during the dissemination phase once the textbook is published.

The Black Sea Initiative on History

The Black Sea Initiative on History brings together history educators and ministry officials from Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey, and Ukraine to discuss how to improve history teaching and history textbooks in that region. At the present time, a Network of Schools is working together to produce projects on archaeological sites near their schools. They will then comment on each other's work. This is an important aspect of the initiative because it includes the pupils in secondary schools. As officials in educational organisations and as experts of educational questions we often tend to talk in a rather abstract way about pupils but it is essential to include them in our work and hear their voices and views.

Another aspect of this Initiative is the way in which the history of the majority and the national minorities are taught. This is an important question for most of the countries involved and often controversial and sensitive issues are needing to be addressed. The Council of Europe is beginning to acquire a certain amount of knowledge and examples about how to address such issues. The work on such topics could involve some teacher training in new methods of teaching controversial and sensitive issues.

During the Seminar on "History textbooks and teaching resources for schools in the Black Sea region" (Odessa, 25-27 May 2000), the participants agreed on the structure of the teaching pack which will be one of the major outcomes of this initiative. The teaching pack will contain supplementary information on the history of the Black Sea and will be distributed not only in the countries of the region but in other European countries where it should serve as background material.

South East Europe

A Working Group on History and History Teaching in South East Europe has been set up within the Stability Pact for South East Europe. The coordination of this working group lies with the Council of Europe. It is interesting that again the importance of history and history teaching has been identified as one of the areas of importance in the Field of education under the Stability Pact. A Programme of Activities was drawn
up and five areas of importance were identified:

- the training of history teachers;
- the development of teaching resources for history teachers;
- history teaching in higher education;
- informal history education for youths;
- the development of a support infrastructure for history teaching.

The Programme aims to contribute to generating greater mutual understanding and tolerance, disseminating more knowledge of the history of South East Europe as an entire region and ensuring that a wider range of perspectives is brought to bear in the writing and teaching of both national and regional history.

History teaching aims to help school pupils to become the future citizens of democratic societies and aims at enhancing students' knowledge of their history and the histories of their neighbours, removing stereotypes from history education, teaching skills such as critical thinking, tolerance, mutual understanding and positive attitudes. Activities are being carried out by different partners who meet to ensure that they do not overlap and that they complement each other.

The Council of Europe will start the work on teacher training with the first major initiative at the generous invitation of the Greek authorities. This is a Conference on "The initial and in-service training of history teachers in South East Europe" and will take place in Athens, from 28-30 September 2000. This Conference will carry out a stocktaking of the existing provision in each of the countries on teacher training and will identify the areas of need for teacher training seminars. The study on initial training and the in-service training seminars will begin in earnest after this Conference.

Finally, all the work which is being carried out on the reform of history teaching in the four regions or countries identified in this article builds on the work already done. It is important not to re-invent the wheel and care is being taken by all the partners involved not to do so.

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COE's publications on initiatives in the RF and main seminar reports

History teaching in the Russian Federation – from the View of Process-oriented Didactics

Introduction

Considering 'history' and 'history teaching' as an applied social science and thus a reflective tool of dealing with past political, social, economic or cultural developments is not a common pattern in today's societies. More often history is used and misused as a justification for the political power of the day. The latter function of history goes together with the suppression of critical and opposite information and thereby helps to maintain unjust relations between the men and women in power, and those who suffer. – Historians have to be aware of this seduction by political power. It is their responsibility either to give a critical and differentiated view of the past or to contribute to its mythologisation and ideologisation.

The 20th century is full of examples which show the danger of political manipulation by history. Nationalistic concepts in history have contributed to a disorientation and blindness of people within and without Europe and this again helped to create an atmosphere of hostility and intolerance in the relations between political and economic representatives of the so called 'nations'. Although we have to consider the complex interrelations of political and economic developments in the period of industrialisation and imperialism as background and drives to war, we may not forget the role of historians who authorised national claims for hegemony: claims which finally led to start the cruelties of two World Wars. - If we look at the victims on both sides of these Wars from a humanitarian point of view. at the millions who died in the concentrations camps, at the millions of the civilian population who lost their lives or who lost their homes and had to emigrate, but also when we consider the fate of the millions of soldiers who were wounded or died, we may ask who were the real winners of these two wars? - We are still lacking a serious structural analysis, e.g. a social or economic history,



Pieta, commemorating the victims of the 'Great Patriotic War' at Mamaya-Hill memorial, Wolgograd, June 2000. A historically Christian symbol taken as pattern for one of the biggest monuments of Communist era is probably apt to demonstrate the despair which lays behind every national heroism. Foto by Alois Ecker

of World War II. We also are in dire need of a complex economic theory of fascism and National Socialism.

It is one of the major questions for historiography and history teaching in the 21st century, whether as scientists or as teachers and educators we wish to give further support to the heroic, nationalistic or otherwise magnificent narrations about the past, or whether we wish to make the coming generation able to reflect upon the past in a more systematic, analytic, critical and multiperspective way. - As teachers and as educators we are working in a long term perspective without knowing whether our efforts will ever have the chance to bring up successful results. From this rather weak position we may only hope today that we will be successful and productive in the sense that our work will foster the peaceful development and co-operation between European countries. Nevertheless we have the chance to work with the next generation in developing their competences for analytic and reflective approaches to the past as well as their competences for critical thinking, open-mindedness, mutual understanding, tolerance and solidarity. By consent to human rights and democratic values we might be able - with the support of the next generation - to overcome the nationalistic legacy of the 20th century in historiography and history teaching.

The Didactics of History – an Applied Social Science

We all know how difficult it is for a *historian* not just to become assistant of the prevailing interpretations of the past but to give a transparent and more objective description which can be used as a tool of reflection by other readers. Gustav Droysen, the Prussian historian, has already described in 1868, how historians are to a certain amount dependant on both the actual trends in historiography as well as the content of the historical sources they use. Nevertheless there is an important difference between a) ideology in history, b) the simple support of current interpretations in history and c) a critical academic description of the past which is empirically based. To believe in the objectivity of a historical text the reader (who is supposed not to have access to primary sources) needs:

- an explicit introduction to the questions of research,
- a transparent description of the author's point of view in relation to the subject of investigation,
- a clear description about the origin of the historical sources which were brought into play,
- an introduction to the methodology which was used in analysing and interpreting the sources, and
- a systematic description of the outcomes of the research work.

To our regret we have to admit that up to our days not all of those who call themselves historians accomplish these standards in writing history.

Compared with these standards of historiography, what are the academic standards for a *didactician*?

As an academic discipline, the didactics of history is still very young. In most European countries the didactics of history has established itself as an independent field just over the last two decades (see references). In this period it has been able to shake off its "ancillary relationship" ("Klientelverhältnis"; Rohlfes (1990:180) with "pure historical science" and to define its own area. This does, however, not mean that the theoretical convictions of scholars in the field are at all unified. Concepts like "historical awareness", "historical culture" or "historical learning" are connected with diverging ways of dealing with historical knowledge. What unites all these approaches is that they see didactics as independent of the study of history per se.

In this new discipline, scholarly debate and theory formation has

been centring around the teaching of history in primary and secondary schools – textbook analysis, curriculum development and teacher training –, as well as the didactics of history in museums or in adult education. More recently the emphasis shifted to the teaching of history with new technologies and teaching history in tertiary education, including universities.

As far as the academic work is concerned we expect the same standards from the didactics in history as from historiography. We expect the didactician to clearly formulate his questions of investigation, we expect him (or her) to make his point of view transparent, to describe the sources of his research, to be analytic in his investigation and systematic in his interpretation; and we expect him or her to be critical towards indoctrination and manipulation.

The specific difference between the didactics of history and historiography may be seen in the focus of interest and in the performance of didactics. The main questions of didactics are related to the structures of communication: A central interest of the discipline regards the process of reception and application of a concrete historical information. This implies that there exists a relevant relationship – in the theory of process-oriented didactics we call it 'the didactic triangle' – between

- the content of the historical subiect.
- the concrete group of people who are dealing with this subject, and
- the medium of mediation/transmittance (e.g. the teacher).

History teachers for example have to deal not only with a certain historical content but also with their personal feelings towards this topic; moreover, they are confronted with a specific dynamic within the concrete audience, e.g. the specific political orientation of a group of students. Beyond these emotions, which hopefully serve our teacher as provisions for self-reflection and fruitful discussion, the didactician has his professional interests: he aims at developing a concrete learning structure which should enable the learners to get a better insight into the historical issue in discussion.

In other words: The concern of history didactics is oriented towards people's daily interest of people: The interest of the pupils, students or adults who are interested in or confronted with historical information. and the (professional) interest of the teacher. The teacher himself, as any human being in relation to others, cannot avoid being emotionally involved in the subject he (or she) teaches (Siegfried Bernfeld 1925; Norbert Elias 1983). He, therefore, has to develop a differentiated methodology to reflect upon these emotions and to handle them care-



Boys playing on tanks which were used by the Russian army during World War II. Kremlin in Nijshnij Novgorod, April 1999. It is the mixture between fascination and fear that makes weapons and arms seem to be indispensable for men. Foto by Alois Ecker fully when teaching. – This is why the didactics of history is confronted with a wider scale of possibilities where ideological indoctrination and manipulation could take place. And this again makes it indispensable to clearly describe the working methods and to handle the tools of didactics with full responsibility towards the learners or the audience.

Having gone so far our readers will readily consent that the didactics of history is not a simple agency for transfers of historiographic results but a more complex enterprise which leans for theoretical support on theories of communication, theories of social systems, social psychology, group dynamics, individual psychology, organisational theories, pedagogical theories and kindred social sciences. The issue of the didactics of history could therefore be summarised as follows:

In the understanding that teaching and education has as its aim the development of socio-political and critical communicative competence, the didactics of history understands itself as an academic discipline which tries to identify those facts about the past (of a certain problem, region, social organisation, political system, civilisation) that are relevant to the

current situation and also a discipline which seeks to impart this "historical knowledge" (in the interest of a projected future) in such a way that the learners can act upon it and incorporate it into their social competence.

This understanding of the didactics of history will not always correspond with established views about "history" and "historical knowledge". Contrary to these the didactics of history sees itself in an active social role: it aims at offering tools for examining current social, political, economic or cultural problems by showing them to be the result of historical development and

hence susceptible to change.

From this point of view the didactics of history is understood to be an *applied social science*. Its central concerns with regard to the teaching of history are as follows:

- 1. In the face of current social developments, what ways of dealing with the past seem particularly necessary and useful for the reflection of the concerned group of people (e.g. students)?
- 2. Which (historical) methods are appropriate for reconstructing

past cultural, social, economic and political situations and their development in a critical and multiperspective dimension?

 What knowledge is necessary in order to foster a historical understanding which is relevant to the current changes in society?

These are the basic issues which the didactics of history needs to resolve within its concrete social environment. As the teaching of history in the Russian Federation is our major concern in this article, we would like to relate these questions also to the actual situation in Russia. It seems useful to start by describing the author's point of view: we will therefore give a sketch of the theoretical background of our approach to the subject "history teaching" at the university of Vienna and then as mirrored in this concept – discuss our impressions of the didactics of history in the RF. The theoretical concept on which we are working in Vienna has been termed "Processoriented didactics of history".

Process-oriented Didactics of History: Aims, Concept, Theoretical and Practical Potential

Let us begin with the description of an actual trend in the educational systems in Europe: Like other highly industrialised regions of the world most European countries are currently undergoing a process of rapid social, political and economic change. These restructurings have a strong impact on the cultural sphere: seemingly stable conventions are undermined, well-established norms and behaviours change rapidly. This process has been termed "accelerated cultural change".

For the educational system, "accelerated cultural change" implies reforms on the organisational level as well as on the level of personal development.

On the organisational level especially the established forms of cooperation have come into discussion on both the inter-institutional links as well as the inner-institutional forms. Should the educational system as a whole be more centralised or de-centralised? Are there institutional links in the co-operation between universities and schools regarding teacher training? What is the quality of such co-operation? Should universities be managed without participation of assistants, lecturers and students? Should parents and pupils be included in decisions of schoolorganisation? How should the team of teachers who work together in a classroom be monitored? - These are just a few questions on the organisational level.

Considering personnel dimension and here especially the teaching profession we may say that the demands have increased enormously over the past years both with regard to content but also with regard to educational and didactic concerns. Increased mobility in our society at large and frequent calls for more flexibility on the labour market require a new conception of "all-round-education". Consequently the teaching profession in secondary as well as in tertiary education not only demands the integration of rapidly growing knowledge in a discipline, it also has to take into account society's increased demand for new skills at the methodological level, like (self)reflective, social, communicative and organisational skills.

Also for the teaching of history the accelerated cultural change sketched above implies that we need new teaching methods which allow the learner experiencing the complexity of social change. We need integrated and dynamic methods of teaching and learning. Such methods should enable the learner not only to acquire declarative knowledge about certain historical facts (e.g. the social dynamics of industrial societies, the restructuring of the family, the changing gender relationship) but to also develop procedural knowledge which can be acted upon in concrete, everyday social situations - in other words such methods should help the learners to develop their social competence.

At the University of Vienna we are working for such complex learning structures in two fields: teacher training and history teaching in secondary schools. A team of didacticians, historians and teacher trainers has been working on developing a new curriculum for teacher trainees who are following the course "History and Social Studies".

The aims of the new curriculum lie in a better integration of the specialist historical, didactic, educational, and practical strands of teacher education. But when developing the curriculum we were not only reforming the concept of initial teacher training, we also had to revise our traditional view of history teaching:

As discussed above, the demands on the teaching profession have increased enormously over the past years both in terms of contents and in terms of pedagogy. This situation demands that the professional character of teaching be developed more strongly than it is at the moment. To accomplish these demands and to have clearly formulated aims which can serve as guidelines for the development of concrete syllabi we have developed a professional profile for the history teacher. This professional profile includes a wide range of academic competences as well as didactic competences, including self-refletive, social, communicative and organisational competences. In view of the current developments in schools and society alike we regard it as particularly important to strengthen the future teachers' ability for co-operation and teamwork.

Regarding the *academic competences* we expect the history teacher to show a certain flexibility in the handling of factual and methodological knowledge about the subject; the ability to establish connections between political, economic, social and cultural developments in the historical period in discussion; the readiness to cross borders between academic disciplines; a choice of teaching contents which is oriented towards the present; a critical and problem-oriented choice and treatment of a historical subject in a way that creates cultural identity.

Among the *didactic competences* we estimate it as important that the history teacher is able to selfreflect, which means to maintain a transparent handling of his (institutional) power; to deal with conflicts constructively; to recognise transference from pupils, to separate it from one's own reaction of counter-transference and, if possible, to arrive at a functional interpretation of that reaction in the context of the classroom. - He also should have a wide range of social and communicative competences: processoriented thinking and work-styles; competence in developing and implementing experience-oriented learning processes; ability to direct, analyse and reflect on processes happening within the learning group. - The next skill area, planning and design skills, requires basic knowledge of learning and developmental theories; knowledge about the appropriateness and application of different media including new technologies; profound procedural knowledge in handling different teaching methods (e.g. lecture, group-work, role-play, project work) and in the handling of media. - Finally we require skills in the analysis of organisations: These skills are of importance in dealing with colleagues, superiors and parents. What is required are analytic skills which enable teachers to be realistic about the possibilities of cooperation within their organisation; also, the ability to plan and implement interdisciplinary co-operation and project-work.

In sum we want to train history teachers who are able not only to present facts about a particular historical topic but to transmit its relevance for the social dynamics of the learning environment. They should be able to choose with pedagogic deliberation from an array of teaching methods, respond flexibly to the social, cognitive, and age-related conditions in the learning group as well as the realities of school-life.

These skills should enable history teachers to fulfil the demands which we see as the central function of the subject "History and Social Studies" in the school curriculum. "History" needs to be part of cultural studies. The subject should provide theories and methods that help to describe and analyse without undue simplification the rapid political, economic, social and cultural changes that we are experiencing. We think that one of the central tasks of tomorrow's schools will be to establish a culture of deliberation and reflection in everyday school-life.

A Broader Concept of Didactics

The job-description presented above already implies some of the central positions which the Vienna circle of history didactics takes up in connection with the concept of didactics and which also inform our relationship towards pedagogy in general:

Our teacher education curriculum is based on a broad understanding of didactics. It implies that a concrete (historical) *topic* is approached in a concrete *social environment* (the classroom and the environment it is embedded in) through certain *methods* and with the help of appropriate *media* (e.g. source texts, tapes, films, CD-ROMs, Internet) in the interest of certain consciousness-forming *aims*.

Our "process-oriented didactics of history" contains several innovations in this respect. The training programme has a strong experience and practice-oriented component, it emphasises the practical work done within the social environment of the school and the classroom and its basic outlook is one that follows the principles of group pedagogy. Our theory building, therefore, draws on methods and insights offered by social-systemic and social-psychological approaches.

The theory of process-oriented didactics in history focuses on the communicative process of teaching and learning history. For the situation in the classroom we might, therefore, say that we regard the learning process (especially learning about history) as a form of communication and thus as a social process. The central idea of this approach is to acknowledge the teaching situation as a social structure in its own right: the history lesson itself is viewed and treated as an independent social system: When performing a history lesson in the classroom, a history teacher and a group of pupils are creating together a special social system, called "history teaching".

In this understanding it is evident that the social dynamics taking place in the teaching situation itself have to be recognised as being part of the learning process. The history teacher in this understanding can only be successful if he/she not only watches the pupils' perception of the historical content but also the social dynamics in the learning group. This observation of the social dynamic has to be made explicit - at least in the teacher's self-reflection - in order to be useful for further learning. Any insights gained from the explicit reflection of social processes must then feed into the planning of the next learning phase.

For the didactics of history this means the awareness, which has to be kept alive at all times, that the teaching situation is a social structure in its own right. Only if the teaching is organised in a dynamic way can it engender learning which produces insight into historical processes. (This idea, however, has not gained much currency either in the training of specialist historians or in the history teaching in schools.)

For the subject history teaching this means in particular: if it is one of the central insights of the profession that political, social, economic and cultural structures change and are changeable then the learning environment, being a social structure itself, has to be organised in such a way that it remains changeable (for all parties involved). The task of conveying historical change in a particular area can be completed successfully only if what is said on the content level is related to the events on the social level of the learning group (between teachers and students, between students and students ...), made explicit and fed back into the learning process.

Misunderstandings on the social stage cause blockages on the content level. The reverse also holds true: if an otherwise plausible hypothesis about the content level fails to be understood, this suggests that there are (latent) social conflicts between the persons involved in the teaching situation. The interdependence of the relationship between the historical content and the social/communicative relationship between teacher and a group of pupils is a constituent of process-oriented didactics.

Behind this assumption lies the conviction that school and university education are still largely built on ritualised forms of learning which tend to hinder rather than foster cognition and insight into complex situations. Future-oriented education, however, demands co-ordinated, integrative and process-oriented forms of learning which facilitate the connection of knowledge and insight, of content and social process. It needs forms of learning which transcend the treatment of specialist knowledge as a kind of mental challenge but make that knowledge real in terms of concrete social competence.

(For more information and an article about 'process-oriented methods in teaching history' see our homepage: http://www.univie.ac.at/Wirtschaftsgeschichte/Index_e. html).



The Educational System of The Russian Federation – a General Approach

It might be interesting for our readers to get a few ideas about the dimensions of the educational system in the Russian Federation: According to national statistics in 1998/99 the total number of school enrolment in general education institutions was 21,969.900, the number of pupils in secondary education was about 14 millions. the total number of teachers in general education institutions was 1,811.000. At the beginning of the academic year 1998/99 there were 1 100 *gymnasia* (with 855.800 pupils) and 745 lyceums (477.900 pupils) in the RF. - Tertiary (higher) education took place in more than 914 institutions of all types (580 public, 334 non-public), including 218 state universities. The total number of students enrolled was 3,598.000 (2,016.000 females), almost 2/3 of them were full-time students; a small group part-time, and more than 1/3 studied by distance education modality. The total number of professors and teachers in higher education institutions was 282.400 (32.800 in non-public institutions).

We have no exact data about history teachers or the number of students of history but it might give an impression of the organisational Practicing folklore dances at a cultural center in Novgorod, November 1997. Foto by Alois Ecker dimension that around 100 public institutions, universities and pedagogical universities, are actually involved in the initial training of history teachers.

Since 1991 the educational system of the RF has been undergoing a profound process of transformation. The declared aims of the educational policy of the government for the reforms of the educational system are to strengthen and develop democratic structures by education, to consolidate national identity and to facilitate the transition towards a market economy. The most important perspective of the reform is to create basic conditions for a transition from a unified, standardized and uniform education system to a differentiated and open one. This implies

- Greater diversity and differentiation of the educational establishments network, including the development of private institutions,
- Regionalisation and municipalisation of the educational system, and
- Support for national school development ensuring a common educational space, with state educational standards and control as an instrument for its maintenance and development.

In fact, with the Law on education which was adopted by the Duma in 1992, the State monopoly on education has been eliminated. This law gives the right of establishing educational institutions to federal and local bodies, domestic and foreign enterprises and institutions, endowed and owned either by the State, non-State, co-operative, private or any other organisations, as well as by physical persons. During the last decade, especially clerical organisations have gained greater influence on education and run a larger number of primary and secondary schools as well as private universities.

Under the current legislation, education is free and compulsory

for all children aged between 6 (or 7) and 15 years (the so-called basic secondary education, which includes primary and lower secondary education and usually lasts nine years).

As there is not much information about the level of education in the RF and as this provokes that the view of "the Russians" is still biased by the stereotype of people being "rough" and "wild" it might be interesting to know that for example the rate of graduates in higher education is about 12% (in Austria 10,7%); 28,5% finish general secondary school, another 22% have a diploma of specialised secondary education (in Austria: 19,8% general + 9,7% specialised + 32,6% vocational schools) – all figures are from 1998.

State educational standards for comprehensive educational establishments and – just recently – for (lower and upper) secondary education are expected to determine the basic level of the content of education common for the whole of Russia and serve as a basis for appraising the level of learners' training.

By law, the State guarantees the observance of the following general principles:

- the humanistic character of education, the overall priority of general human values, life and health, and free personal development;
- the education aims at fostering students' civic spirit and love of the Motherland;
- the unity of federal cultural and educational space, preserving at the same time ethnic and regional cultural traditions;
- the general availability of education, which should respond to students' peculiarities and different choices;
- the secular character of education in state and municipal educational institutions;
- the freedom and pluralism in education;
- the democratic and State-public character of educational manage-

ment, as well as the autonomy of educational institutions.

Most of these notions give open space to a free and flexible development in education; at the same time the wording sounds as wide and contradictory as in any other curriculum or general guideline of a Western European country. - It is nevertheless significant for the period after the fall of Communism that new emphasis has been given to the "love of the motherland". Russian historiography is still struggling for a new binding theory in history. But as there is no teleological perspective in academic historical discourse and research, these attempts risk to fall back to patriotic feelings on the one side or to nationalistic propaganda on the other. Moreover, it seems to be very difficult in a phase of growing regional autonomy and 'national' movements to evoke a new and acceptable identity of the Russian nation. But to create this new identity seems to be the predominant task of many Russian historians for the time being.

It is not our task to criticise these tendencies in parts of the new Russian historiography from a political or moral point of view. It is a fact that all European countries are still working on building their national history and they judge it their legitimate job to do so. - Yet from the scientific point of process oriented didactics we have developed at the beginning of our reflection we may question the sense of such an activity. What is the purpose of this occupation? What are the aims and objectives of constructing national identity by history? We figure that it might be useful to debate similar questions and we also think that it might be interesting to analyse what happens in everyday school life when teaching 'national' history.

The Didactics of History in the Russian Federation

We have shown above that during the last decade the trend of reforms

in the highly elaborated and differentiated educational system of the RF went from a centralised hierarchic organisation to a stronger emphasis on regional autonomy and tendencies of pluralism and democratisation. This development is also visible when we regard the organisational development of didactics in general. Reforms have started already in the 1980ies, especially in theoretical, methodological and psychological reflections, yet since the beginning of the 1990ies we notice a stronger interest in questions of didactics: for example in the newly established regional pedagogical universities. This trend had its reverberations in the didactics of history. Regional universities have gained self-confidence also by strengthening the development of departments of didactics in history.

History as a subject of scientific discussion as well as a subject of teaching in secondary education had played a prominent role in the former CCCP. History was one of the main pillars of Marxist theory and because of that it remained very often in close relation to state ideology: To study history was of a certain interest also for those who wanted to start a political career in the Communist Party. Teachly history had also the function of explaining fundamental questions like 'where do we come from?' and 'where shall we go?'. - Justification as a predominant function of writing and teaching history has certainly diminished considerably during the last decade. There are many efforts to develop history as an academic discipline which is no longer dependant on state ideology. Especially from a Western European perspective we have to consider that not every result of former historical research should be neglected or treated as 'false' because (!) it had been published during the period of Communism. There are quite a few directions of historical research which should be regarded as serious and, therefore, be treated with open

judgement, especially in the field of social history. – Nevertheless it would be desirable to inquire more systematically the role of history and history teaching in present day Russian society. In the following we will discuss this question by describing

some developments regarding history teaching: curricula, textbooks and teacher training for secondary schools.

After the end of the Communist regime more space and autonomy in curriculum development was given to regional authorities and to the individual choice of schools and teachers. For some years in the middle of the 1990ies it seemed as if liberalism and pluralism had gained even a stronger role than in most Western European history curricu-

la. In fact, this period of experiment and incertitude only lasted for a short time. Since then a new core curriculum has been developed and recently published for primary and secondary education (see also the article of Ludmila Alexashkina in this volume).

This new curriculum allows a maximum of 15 % of time to regional history; the rest is devoted, apart from compulsory federal components, to the teaching of the new Russian history and World history. It is evident that the value "love for the motherland" also plays an important role in the conception of the new history curriculum. A big emphasis still rests with political history and efforts of creating a new national identity by history.

As many authors describe, it often seems as if the former Marxist structure has been replaced by a somewhat new terminology – which is built on citations of national and so called patriotic historiography on the one hand and citations which are taken from the so called historiography of civilisation and an-



Seminar staff at the 'Seminar on initial and in-service training of history teachers in the Russian Federtion', Ekaterinburg, April 1998. Foto by Alois Ecker

thropology on the other. It was not so clear, however, for our observation what the sources and methods of this history of civilisation are.

From various discussions in seminars I got the impression that there is an incertitude in today's historical interpretation which is sometimes experienced as a big challenge – but in many other relations also as a heavy burden. I remember the discussions at a seminar on national identity in history in Novgorod in 11/1997, where participants discussed very heatedly how to give an actual sense to notions such as 'patriotism', 'national identity', without at the same time fall into the traps of nationalistic historiography. The historians will have to base their work on empirical work with critical methods and serious examination of their sources if they want to be successful in this task.

If we adapt the questions we have put at the beginning of our reflection for the didactics of history, we may ask in view of the actual situation in the RF:

- 1. How can historians, history teachers and teacher trainers deal with the heritage of the Russian Empire as well as with the heritage of the former CCCP in an adequate way, so that history or history teaching can be developed to subjects of political, cultural and/or societal reflection? How can this development take place without ignoring or rejecting the former periods, without neglecting also the empirical historiographic data of research on the one hand - but without going back to nationalistic, ideological or mythological concepts of history on the other hand?
- 2. What could be done (in historical research as well as in teacher training at universities and academies) to improve the teaching and learning of appropriate methods for the reconstruction of the past cultural, social, economic and political situations and/ or their development?

3. What could be done in the development of organisation as well as in teacher education to strengthen social and communicative competences, e.g. co-operation and teamwork as well as attitudes like mutual understanding, critical thinking, open-mindedness, tolerance and civil courage?

It might also be useful in this respect not only to ask how to analyse and to write about political history but to ask how to write about economic developments, social or cultural changes. It is not only by political history that citizens built up their historic identity. In Austria we made good experiences by bringing results of social history closer to students' and pupils' minds: Family history, the history of childhood, the history of labour, of crafts, of agriculture, of industrial work offer much more opportunities to identify and to ask what happened in the past. It seems useful to know for citizens of a modern democratic society how their parents and grandparents have lived.

Yet it might be suspicious in the eves of the young generation to describe monotony or suffering of every day-life in household, field or factory simply as heroic stories: The factory worker who plans the World Revolution, the housewife who relieves him from heavy thoughts by washing his clothes, the mighty hero-soldier who supports his noble task in training his fighting strength might be to far away from the banalities of life the children as used to experience in daily life. - It has to be questioned seriously whether young children do really need heroes in history. A realistic description of every-day-life situations in the past might be a bigger challenge for historians and history teachers than the fantastic supermen we still find in many textbooks (- and superwomen, if we find any!).

But it is not only the choice of the historical *content* which comes into play as an important factor in the process of building up historical consciousness. It is also the form and the structure of learning. This is what had been discussed among didacticians of history in the RF since the 1980ies - especially for the conception and design of history textbooks. It has been elaborated also regarding the structures and the methods of teacher training. (see also the article of Ludmila Andrukhina). I have described my opinions in this respect before, so I will not repeat what was said before about the importance of carefully regarding the learning structures and reflecting upon the working process in a concrete social environment. For me it is evident that in these dimension lays the greatest task of reform but also the biggest potential for fruitful development of historical consciousness.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying how grateful I am for this opportunity to work with historians and didacticians in the Russian Federation. Through this work I have gained a wider perspective not only on historical thinking but also on my political judgement and critical abilities. It is my hope that we will contribute, through this work to a peaceful and prosperous development of our countries in the 21st century without repeating the mistakes of former generations.

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Working group at the 'Second Stocktaking Conference on the reform of history teaching in the Russian Federation', St Petersburg, March 1999. Foto by Alois Ecker

The Development of History Curricula for Secondary Schools in the Russian Federation

The New Situation of the 1990s

The characteristic features of teaching history in Russian secondary schools over the past decade have been significant changes in the structure and content of history courses.

As for the structure, two cycles of history teaching - on the one hand for the fifth to ninth formers (eleven to fifteen-year-olds) and for the tenth and eleventh formers (16 and 17-year-olds) - have been established instead of the so-called "linear" course (fifth to eleventh forms), which had existed from the 1960s. It meant that world and national history from the ancient ages to our days was to be studied from the fifth to ninth forms and to comprise a total of 374 units altogether instead of the previous 612 units from the fifth to eleventh forms. This change has greatly influenced the selection of historical subjects and contents.

At the same time, the most significant innovations in content were precipitated by new philosophical and methodological approaches in contemporary historical science in Russia. The Marxist theory, throughout many years the sole means to explain both past and present, had lost its standing. A number of other historical conceptions, including theories of civilisations, cultural and anthropological approaches, were employed both in the field of historical research and in school courses. As far as these approaches gained acceptance, new versions and evaluations of history emerged in school textbooks. At the same time, some accents changed within the picture of the past, greater attention was given to the history of the peoples, to personal history.

The decisive element in the general situation of history teaching in the 1990s proved to be the destruction of the preceding centralised school system. A great number of curricula appeared in different regions and separate schools. The idea to work out general curricula as instruments for maintaining the "common educational framework" seemed to be very important. By the year 1993 the first projects for curricula and syllabi had been drawn up and elaborated.

Curricula and Syllabi in History Teaching Today

What was the legacy of the 1980s in the field of school curricula? In the 1980s the main aims of studying history were declared as follows: to acquire what was considered fundamental historical knowledge (facts, ideas, laws); to form a definite outlook on the world; to develop learning strategies and abilities for independent work. The traditional view of curricula for secondary schools in Russia could be characterised as 'academically oriented'. As for history this entailed a vast and detailed description of historical content course by course and topic by topic, with a recommended amount of units assigned to each part. In the 1980s new components were included in the curricula according to researches in didactics and psychology: a) demands on pupils' skills and activities, b) recommendations

for interdisciplinary coordination c) marking guidelines for teachers. The idea that the supreme function of education was to impart all kinds of social experience enriched the curricula structure and exerted great influence on pedagogical practice. A core curriculum of history, which followed the above described type, was last published in 1992.

In the following years of the 1990ies there was no more core curriculum of history for secondary schools in Russia being published. Instead, so-called "authors' programmes" were implemented. As overcoming previous historical conceptions and evaluations was considered the most important task, a great number of the "authors' curricula" exclusively focused on historical content, without allowing for more scope for pedagogical aims, pupils' activities or anything alike.

When curricula were drawn up and elaborated as a new normative instrument, certain demands on both content and pupils' activities had to be established. The following aims of studying history at secondary schools were suggested:

- learning from the knowledge about diverse historical experiences of mankind (labour, ethic, social experiences, connections between people and states etc);
- developing abilities and strategies to study historical and contemporary sources, to employ methods of historical analysis and criticism;
- greater self-determination of the pupils on the basis of giving serious thought to social experiences, ideas of humanism and human rights, patriotism and democracy;
- promoting pupils' humanistic education, their respect for the traditions and culture of their own and other nations, respectively, as well as enhancing the capacities for mutual understanding between peoples and states.

These main objects were laid down in a rather concise form in curricula,

any ideological or political statements had been left out.

Six sets of demands on pupils' activities, learning strategies and historical capacities were put down: 1. chronological knowledge and skills; 2. factual knowledge; 3. skills of studying sources; 4. the ability to give descriptions (reconstructions of history); 5. analysis; 6. to concern oneself with opposing versions and evaluations. According to these objects two levels of demands were established - for primary (basic) nine-year schools and for secondary schools. As for working with sources, for example, students of the tenth and eleventh forms (16 and 17-year-olds) are expected to be able:

- 1. to describe the outlook, characteristic features and language of a source;
- 2. to search one or a few sources for certain information;
- to compare various sources with one another in view of the informational content, find and bring out

common points and perspectives but also differences (perhaps even opposing versions);

- 4. to tell about the author of a source, its functions, purpose, reliability etc;
- 5. to characterise personal (political, religious, social, etc.) views and positions of the author of a document;
- to explain what might be the reason (basis) for the particular versions and evaluations expounded in a source;
- to express their own attitude towards information provided by sources.

Pupils attending primary school are expected to master points 1, 2, 3 and 7.

In accordance with projects on curricula development the "basic curricula" have been worked out, approved by the Ministry of Education in the RF and published in 1999.

It was arranged that the educational authorities in the various regions might include in their curricula, apart from the compulsory federal components, some additional materials dealing with regional and local history (15 per cent of the overall time devoted to teaching history may be spent on such purposes).

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Young Guards at Mamaya Hill, Wolgograd, 22 June 2000. Foto by Alois Ecker

Active methods of secondary school teacher training

The article is devoted to the use of active methods in secondary school teacher training.

In this article I am going to cover the following issues:

- 1. Why are active training methods and, in particular, psychological training, widely used nowadays in adult training?
- 2. Which programmes of psychological training may be used for secondary school teacher training?
- 3. How to train those who actually hold teacher training courses?

Active methods are widely employed in adult training, because to a certain degree these methods allow overcoming the impact of stereotypes and rigid structures.

It is a well-known fact that in the process of training and the exploration of the new an individual passes through several levels:

- Level of unconscious incompetence,
- Level of conscious incompetence,
- Level of conscious competence,
- Level of unconscious competence.

These active methods, as opposed to the traditional ones (lectures, reading literature), allow switching guickly from the level of unconscious incompetence to that of conscious incompetence, which means perceiving the mistakes and errors in activity and behaviour. In the future these active methods allow accomplishing more consistent results when passing through the level of conscious competence. This level is impeded by the fact that it requires an effort of will that a person might not always be prepared to make without professional assistance.

In the process of training secondary school teachers various active methods, such as business games, case studies, discussion etc., may be taken into account. Among these methods psychological training plays an increasingly important role.

Training is a multifunctional method of premeditated changes in personal and group psychological phenomena in order to harmonize one's professional and personal entity (1).

Training is held in groups of ten to sixteen persons. It may last for a varying amount of time, from a few hours to several days. The majority of programmes are devised for 3-4 days (24-32 hours).

Training ensures building and developing important professional qualities, abilities and their transition to the level of skills and creates the preconditions for personal problem management and the development of characteristic personal traits. The peculiarity of this method is that it provides an opportunity for change not only on the level of concrete professional working experience but also on the level of professional groups and organisations. Changes are most likely to occur in the field of the efficiency of professional activities, skills and abilities, in the system of principles, values and objectives and at the level of reflection.

Training efficiency is provided by the abidance by methodological principles, the level of the trainer's professionalism as well as the selection of an adequate complex of training programmes.

These are the specific principles of training as an active method within the educational process:

- The principle of activity active involvement of training group participants is very significant. People take part in especially devised activities and programmes. These include case plays, e.g. a conversation between a student and a teacher, exercise performances, e.g. observing other participants' behaviour according to a special scheme.
- 2. The principle of creative positioning means that during training participants discover and awake to the logics of activities and behaviour patterns that may be utilised in their work. It is particularly important that they understand their personal resources, opportunities and peculiarities and, therefore, get the opportunity to change. To fulfil this principle a trainer designs the cases that allow training group participants realising and also training new ways of behaviour and adopting ideas. The creative environment is formed in the training group. The main features of the creative environment are as follows: it ought to be problem-conscious, tolerant (any action on the part of a participant is accepted and not evaluated) and safe.
- 3. The principle of behaviour realisation. The main point of this principle is that the training participants' behaviour is transferred to the conscious level. It allows producing changes. The panacea in this respect is feedback. An important task for a trainer is to create the necessary preconditions for efficient feedback in a group. The use of audiovisual technologies enhances and stimulates feedback. It is important to take into account that videotaping is an instrument that may have a powerful impact. It may exert negative influence and should, therefore, be used with a great deal of care and, what is most important, professionalism.
- 4. The principle of partnership. In

accordance with this principle a trainer creates a special kind of interaction within a group – partnership. The characteristic features of such interaction are the consideration of all the participants' communicative interests, feelings, emotions and the acceptance of other people's personalities. When this principle is translated into reality it allows creating an atmosphere of safety, trust and openness. Such an atmosphere allows group participants experimenting with various behaviour patterns and strategies.

5. The principle of reality is aimed at the creation of an environment shaped by characteristic features, which come close to the participants' social and professional environment during training and relate to elements of practical teaching experience at se-

condary schools.

It is expedient to use a complex of programmes oriented towards the acquisition of knowledge, the building of abilities and skills and the development of the teacher's personality during the process of secondary school teacher education and training.

The employees of the Training Institute (Saint-Petersburg) constantly hold training courses with secondary school teachers. The objective of this work is to increase the personal and professional competence of teachers. Usually, we start systematic work with tea-

chers by an interactive seminar on working out strategies and tactics pertaining to teaching at schools. It helps in the further cooperation with teachers because it creates a strategic context and increases the level of mutual understanding and motivation.

Our experience proves that it is most efficient to follow a certain structural ploy with regard to the composition of training: first, creativity training, then training of efficient pedagogical communication, followed by sensitivity training, assertiveness training, and eventually training courses, which help outline and design respective pedagogical activities. If necessary, learning to devise strategies of interaction with aggressive teenagers may also be included.

Creativity training is directed at the development of non-standard, constructive ways of thinking and behaviour. During training teachers realise the barriers for developing and displaying creativity, which helps them avoid creating such barriers for children and teenagers. Besides, they learn how to form a creative environment and manage the creative process. This is essential because in our modern changing world it is much more important



for a teacher to teach and instruct students how to learn rather than simply imparting a wealth of factual knowledge. In our programme of creativity training participants are offered the following stages within the creative process: preparation, frustration, fomentation, insight and working out.

During creativity training teachers get the opportunity to discuss and

Young children in the Arsenal of the Kremlin, Nijshnij Novgorod, April 1999. Foto by Alois Ecker formulate the qualities and specific behaviour patterns that help cope with an ever-changing world. Requisite qualities and abilities that were pointed out by teachers at creativity trainings include optimism, self-acceptance as well as the acceptance of the world in all its variety, a fair sense of humour, sociability, empathy, capacity for work, purposefulness, persistence etc. As a result of this work the efficiency and capacity of teachers to awaken and develop these very qualities in their students is enhanced.

Training of efficient pedagogical communication is directed at the development of the teacher's communicative competence. The will and ability to embark upon ways of communication and interaction, conversational and contacting skills as well as active listening are formed and continuously improved; ways of argumentation are apperceived during this training.

Assertiveness training allows forming the skills of assertive, confident, demeanour, learning to distinguish between assertive, unassertive and aggressive behaviour. During this training teachers realise the sources of their assertiveness and unassertiveness, respectively. It permits them to understand how they might spark unassertive responses on the part of their pupils and students by their own inefficient behaviour. Assertiveness training also includes work units with the objective of formulating ideas and convictions and promotes each one's capacity for self-appraisal.

The efficiency of each pedagogical activity depends on how well a teacher's sensitivity is developed. Sensitivity in our sense denotes the capacity to perceive, understand, remember and structure social-psychological characteristics of a person and a group.

In the process of sensitivity training the following objectives ought to be envisioned and accomplished (2):

1. The development of abilities re-

garding psychological observation.

- 2. Realising and overcoming interpretive tendencies that appertain to the effect of factual knowledge and stereotypes.
- 3. The creation and development of a capacity to forecast other people's behaviour, to foresee one's own impact on it.

During pedagogical activity training and learning to design such activities the following issues are taken into consideration and worked out in practice:

- 1. The main tendencies of educational development. Educational standards and curricula.
- 2. The technical term of pedagogical planning and designing and its objectives.
- 3. Values and objectives of education.
- 4. Shaping the educational process: elements, structures.
- Criteria that are relevant for devising the elements and contents of educational programmes.
- 6. Lesson structuring: objective, subject, content, object, means, interaction, result.

Our experience in working together with secondary school teachers in Saint Petersburg and other cities in Russia shows that conducting teacher trainings on a systematic basis yields the following results:

- 1. The optimisation of interaction between teachers is accomplished.
- The interaction between teachers and students becomes increasingly cooperative.
- 3. The willingness to change, to a conscious perception of the new, increases. Teachers learn how to become aware of and surmount their stereotypes.
- 4. Their activity and behaviour patterns become more conscious. Skills of formulating objectives and eventually accomplishing these objectives in practice are developed and improved.
- 5. Teachers acquire knowledge and skills, which allow them using training elements and interactive methods in their lessons.

One of the prerequisites for efficient training is the trainer's own professionalism. The factors, which determine the level of an instructor's professionalism, are in particular specific personal qualities (a high grade of intelligence, the will, strength and communicative potential), in-depth subject knowledge and skills that may be acquired in the process of special training.

There are different versions of the organisation of methodological education for specialists in the field of training.

My colleagues and I have been conducting methodological training for specialists for about seventeen years now. In this work we have come a long way from the initial point that a specialist holding training courses hardly enjoyed the right of encouraging, emboldening and enabling group participants to try out things they themselves wouldn't do in their lives. The methodological education programme, therefore, includes the stages of acquiring knowledge, forming abilities and skills and it also comprises units devoted to the objective of personal development.

At present the shortest basic training version comprises 15 days (120 hours) and includes the following issues:

- Training specificities such as the method of premeditated changes, the main spheres of training application, the various types and principles of training.
- Focal methodological ways used in training: group discussion, role-play, psychological gymnastics etc.
- The development of the trainer's skills at different stages of training group work (preparation, stimulation of capacities for working in practice, the stage of orientation, the stage of training/ change, final stage)
- The main logics of drawing up training programmes.
- Realising and expressing personal problems that may influence

one's work with the group in a negative way.

• Sensitivity development.

Specialists taking part in basic methodological training may participate in other kinds of training as well and thereby master these programmes. Besides, they acquire significant knowledge in view of working out themselves new types of training. Article revised by Stefan Menhofer, © 2000

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Ludmila M. Andrukhina

Development of the Initial and In-service Training for History Teachers in the Russian Federation

The concepts and strategies of teacher training in many respects determine the productivity and character of changes in education. This applies especially to an educational system, which is on its way to realise the establishment of democratic values and human rights in general education. In this respect initial and in-service training for history teachers are related to a wider range of problems in education:

- In the process of the modernisation of education the teacher occupies one of the central spots. As Maitland Stobart, one of the initiators of the Council of Europe's project on the reform of history teaching in the Russian Federation, has pointed out, it is the teacher that is "the most important resource" of the educational system in all countries.
- The changes occurring in education open great opportunities for the teacher's creativity and independence, but at the same time they also assign to him high responsibility for the produced

results. This is precisely the reason why it is absolutely essential in our days to provide the teachers with effective preparation programmes and support their work.

- The new socio-cultural and political situation, which forms the background to modern education in the RF, and its somewhat ambiguous development has considerable effect on the professional activity of the teacher. These conditions precipitate the emergence and proliferation of a number of complex and difficult problems. As to be able to cope with them the teacher needs to be encouraged and supported by effective structural changes, such as measures geared towards the improvement of both basic education and professional skills.
- Historical education and history teaching in schools played and still plays a significant role in both the social development of a country and its willingness to reform political conditions. Over

the past ten years the purposes and tasks, basic principles, contents and methodologies of historical education have changed. Frankly, it is impossible to solve the tasks one is confronted with today without the introduction of adequate changes in teacher training and the improvement of professional skills.

• The modern history teacher is not only a professional who has acquired profound professional knowledge, not least with regard to intricate questions of developmental psychology, but he or she is also entrusted with the task of humanizing and harmonizing the teaching atmosphere. The history teacher ought to be very understanding and sensitive, capable of assisting in the individual development of a child, building the pupils' confidence and awareness and forming their cultural identity - such is the profile of demands Tatiana Milko, the administrative assistant of the abovementioned Council of Europe's project, has in mind. At the same time, the teacher should be able to cooperate, enter dialogue with different sections of the population, express his position and participate in processes assisting the establishment of democratic values in society. This means that it is absolutely necessary to lay great emphasis in initial teacher training on the target of searching new forms in both the methods and strategies of teacher training and the improvement of professional skills, which would allow the teacher developing personal potential and necessary personal and social qualities.

 Today, the basic initial teacher training in the RF can not provide the teacher with knowledge and skills for ever. "Life-long education", as it is understood today, denotes a new strategic position all over the world. It makes a wealth of new demands on the teacher, as she (he) should be able to meet the educational requirements on each level of professional development. The system of initial and, especially, in-service training and the strategies of improving professional skills should be revised and adapted to modern requirements so that these programmes will help teachers realise their educational objectives.

The changes in the system of initial and in-service training of history teachers in Russia greatly differ in intensity, as in the meantime not only regional changes are envisioned but also the transition in general to an entirely new strategy of development. Some ten to fifteen years ago the system of initial and in-service training of history teachers in Russia (in the former USSR, respectively) was characterized by the following hallmarks:

- Unification and ideologisation of the contents of history teacher training and education programmes, which did not permit a variety of different positions, conceptions and opinions.
- Domination of political history, the history of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, detriment to cultural and regional history, the history of ethno-cultural development, economic and social history etc.
- Limited access to original historical sources and state standar-

disation of didactic programmes and teaching aids (ideologically verified state programmes, tutorials, materials for both pupils and teachers).

- Formed by the established system of education, the teacher's role amounted to that of a "transmitter" of ideologically verified historical knowledge. These general conditions were shaped by extreme academic rigour at the level of higher education and a very narrow methodological orientation of the system of in-service teacher training.
- The requirements on teachers' professionalism were predetermined by a requisite know-how oriented towards in-depth knowledge of the subject. The methodological preparation, as far as it existed at all in special in-service teacher training courses, and the demands on the acquisition of practical teaching abilities were virtually identical to the content of programmes designed for the pupils. Attention was not centred on the development of strategies and competences, as is nowadays characteristic of adult education.
- The self-contained character of the system of initial and in-service training, owing to ideological and political barriers, made it practically impossible for history teachers to participate in international cooperation or public associations and movements.
- The questions of initial and inservice teacher training were considered for a long time a problem of organisation and administration, though not a subject of regular scientific research and analytical development. V.V. Rozanov, the well-known Russian philosopher at the beginning of the 20th century, wrote that one of the main problems of the development of education was the absence of a philosophy of education in Russia. Today, it is still possible to argue that the lack of attention paid to the conceptual

analysis of structural problems in education (and in this context we especially refer to teacher training and further education) remains a painful predicament in the development of new methods and strategies.

At the same time, at various stages in history there has always been a guest for and also the practical emergence of new forms in initial and in-service teacher training in Russia, which could and did not find general, extensive embodiment, but in their variety nevertheless formed considerable potential for further educational development. Today, one recurs to the approaches and practical experience of the pre-revolutionary period and the humanistic eagerness of the nineteen twenties and sixties and in many ways these models inspire intensive changes, which increasingly relate to the practical contents of education, as opposed to organisational and personal development:

- With regard to the content: if we compare aspects of world, European, Russian and regional history, the process of regionalisation has recently been attributed a more pronounced standing. Regional history has been incorporated in various forms into educational programmes and profiles of initial and inservice teacher training. On the other hand, we can observe a growing tendency to humanise the interpretation of history, to aspire to a new appraisal of world and European history.
- State guidelines and educational standards express a new understanding of the purposes and values of education, beginning with in-service teacher training. The principal aim is to raise the standard of teachers' qualifications in view of questions of shaping and developing the contents of education.
- As for the presentation of history in general, a change in favour of a complex approach to the

understanding of historical processes has been taking place. At each level of education as well as in the system of improving professional skills the need of the introduction of integrated courses, which impart historicalgeographical, economic-historical and cultural - historical contents, is now increasingly recognised. The study of diverse disciplines related to history allows the complete adaptation to higher levels of education, reconstructing the cultural-historical environment and abandoning the one-sided state-political interpretive perspective of history.

- In schools, historical disciplines are paid greater attention in view of their role as integrative factors in school education; this has also an impact on initial teacher training. ITT in this respect faces the challenge to redefine its aims and objectives.
- The percentage of the strictly academic elements in the training and further education of history teachers still remains very high. But the contents undergo changes. The history curriculum is not reduced anymore to rehashing facts and theories. Instead, it increasingly turns into an instrument aiding the appraisal and reconstruction of the integrity of historical processes and events. At school level, academic education is understood as the basis of integration and as a fundamental component of historical education and, therefore, the academic orientation remains very dominant in initial teacher training. In higher educational institutions cyclic programmes of general cultural and methodological initial training have been set up, faculties of Pedagogics and Psychology were formed. In pedagogical high schools specialisation and further training for teacher trainers, as well, gradually enters the picture. On the basis of this specialisation ge-

neral educational standards and state guidelines are developed, there are initial programmes and handbooks.

These are the most significant changes in the strategies, methods and organisational structures of teacher training:

- On the one hand, the education of the teacher follows new objects. which lay down the demands on teachers' professional - pedagogical competences, on the other hand new models are worked out - taking into account the variety of practical experience at different levels of education as well as the requirements that result from the day-to-day realities of teaching history in schools. This finds expression in the search for optimal models regarding the organisation of the contents of education as well as training structures. The prime challenge is to develop adequate models for various forms of education, which allow for the demands made on teachers with regard to flexibility, variety, choice and swift adaptation to changes in educational conditions. The multilevel and modular course approach in the organisation of education comes to the fore increasingly, one differentiates between various patterns and structures of education, depending on the level of skills and the professional experience of the teacher.
- The practice of international exchange in the sphere of initial and in-service teacher training is intensively promoted, international projects and programmes, which require active participation on the part of history teachers, are realised. The educational programmes and seminars of the Council of Europe (compare the article by Alison Cardwell, the administrator of the COE's project on the reform of history teaching in the Russian Federation) further the formation of regional educational communities and in

the Russian Federation as a whole, they foster the intensification of contacts concerning both, strategic coordination and redefining positions in the field of teaching history.

The seminars became "prime movers" and original "platforms". At these seminars not only the most urgent questions are addressed and discussed, they also provide powerful stimuli for the development of further pedagogical and methodical practice in various regions of Russia.

The structural changes in the educational system go in the direction of de-ideologization, humanization and the development of a democratic character of pedagogical relations on the following levels:

- Cooperation (partnership) between teacher and pupil, building a new pedagogical culture of intensified relations.
- Cooperation among the teachers as colleagues, recognising the necessity of training teachers' skills of coping with leadership functions, etc.
- Social partnership within the system of school organisation, assuming a joint identity as history teachers on the part of the staff, involvement in social activities: developing a ramified educational network/framework (for instance in associations, public movements).
- Enriching the practical experience of teaching history in conditions, which pose a variety of different questions.

The changes described above have an impact on the conception of future ITT for history teachers. Among the priorities in the development of initial and in-service training one should line out the improvement of the professional skills of history teachers:

- Psychological-pedagogical components of teacher training need to be reinforced.
- Growing value is attached to didactic competences and a flexible way of dealing with the

methodology of history in initial and in-service training of history teachers;

The development of an information culture for teachers and information bases in teacher training, including the use of new communication technologies and strategies (networking, distance education)has to be furthered.

The legal framework as well as the conceptual and organisational structures of the system of initial and in-service teacher training are currently in the making. The National Concept of the Development of Education is currently implemented, the federal administration bills and a federal programme on the development of additional vocational training are about to be translated into reality, the number of candidates writing dissertations on problems of teacher training is steadily rising.

At the same time, there are many unsolved problems. There is a constant process of searching organisational forms, methods, strategies and contents of teacher training and education, which may prove to be apposite to the change in conditions and could provide valuable orientations for historical education in schools. False alternatives have to be called into question and debated: the question, for instance, whether the reform of history teaching should start by changing the quality of initial teacher training or that of the courses of in-service training. There is no doubt that reforms have to be put into practice on both levels at the same time. Frequently, however, one still encounters the opinion that "if the level and quality of initial teacher training are raised, in-service training becomes somewhat unnecessary". Today, general recognition prevails that both, initial and in-service teacher training are of equal importance, and there should be a process of outlining and defining the specific features and characteristics of either type of teacher training.

The system of additional professional teacher training seems more dynamic and mobile today. The system of in-service teacher training, in our opinion, still shows large potential for development, and together with the system of initial training in higher education can create the necessary preconditions for and the methodological background to the development of new competences of history teachers.

Today, the system of in-service training and the improvement of professional skills of the teachers already offer a variety of options:

- Combining long-term (1-2 years) and short-term educational programmes.
- An operative updating of the contents of education and educational methodologies;
- A variety of educational demands on teachers and their qualifications at each respective starting level is taken into account and adequately dealt with.
- Teamwork in groups and working together with experts at various levels of education (maximum, average, special, basic and additional), academics and experienced practitioners, these activities are an essential part of teacher training.
- Building systematic connections between educational research, the outlook of training programmes and the academic analysis of training activities.
- Developing integrated educational programmes with the aid of concrete educational projects and pedagogical initiatives.

The conceptual appraisal and analysis and the systematic outline of the perspectives of various educational models take precedence. In this context I should like to offer some personal reflections about perspective contents of history teaching.

The features of this or that model of education and teacher training are determined by the answers they can provide to the following questions:

What should the main object (pur-

pose) of changes be – should they relate to the teacher and his competence or the general system, in which he/she works?

- Is it useful for the teacher in an educational system to be guided by a "professional profile" of demands on history teachers or should one rather recur to the variety of difficulties, opportunities and differences in the level of actual skills that are encountered in the concrete daily experiences of history teachers (i.e. "actual" – which is to say realistic – or "professional" profiles)?
- Should priority be given in teacher training to the projected organisational forms within the given (and in so far limited) system of opportunities, which assume precise orientations to produce concrete results, lean on examination and evaluation of these achievements and strictly control the dynamics of changes, or to an open educational environment that stimulates the development and self-development of the teacher on account of the non-linearity of its organisational structure, which limits the scope for strict examination and control of results?

The actual development of theory and practice in history teacher training can be connected, basically to three important models, which form the perspective of discussion:

- Model of organisational development (P. Shmak, USA);
- Model of process-oriented didactics of history (Alois Ecker, Austria);
- Model of cultural learning and developing an educational environment (Russia).

The model of organisational development, which is actively realised in the USA, suggests that the object and purpose of necessary changes to be translated into reality regard the level of school organisation, the teachers ought to learn to explore and appraise their own organisational structures and background. Such a position is based on the recognition that in practice the improvement of the teacher's professional skills is not directly connected to an increase in the efficiency of his/her work at school. Attempts to realise one's creative potential as a teacher, are thwarted, as a rule, by the conservatism of school organisation. Only the strategy "of organisational development", directed at the further development and improvement of all aspects of the school system can, in the opinion of the proponents of this model, help teachers discover unused resources, stimulate and utilise the potential that lies dormant. The programmes of in-service training and the improvement of professional skills are focused on the requirements of school systems, the social-psychological methods and strategies are employed with the object of furthering each teacher's pedagogical development as well as the didactic competences of the entire teaching staff. Special attention is paid to the development of a culture of dialogue and communicative patterns, selfreflection and self-appraisal, joint efforts in view of shaping and furthering the educational process and school structures.

Although this model intensively develops and positively changes the organisational, social-psychological characteristics of school systems, to some extent it leaves unanswered several important questions addressing the content and methodology of historical education, the interrelation of organisational forms and the precious variety of orientations, which is especially important in historical education.

The second, process-oriented model, developed at the University of Vienna by the team around A. Ekker, concentrated on changes in the competence of the history teacher. "The professional profile" of the history teacher that was developed within the framework of this model allows gaining a new understanding of the process of teacher training as a social experience. In this model the main emphasis is laid on the connection and combination of cognitive and social competence, at the stage of theoretical-didactic preparation trainee teachers are already confronted with situations, which bring them into contact with practical experiences of history teaching, urgent historical questions and issues of vital social relevance are addressed in a process-oriented way of didactic learning. Such situations help the students and trainee teachers with the aid of teachers and practitioners to develop a personal awareness and appraisal of history and not least to acquire the necessary social competence.

Alois Ecker's model offers new perspectives on the present situation and means a genuine progress as regards the development of didactics at the level of higher education. This model, however, falls short of reconciling the discrepancies between the teacher's "professional profile" and the variety of actual demands, which the teachers are confronted with in their day-to-day realities of teaching the subject. It is especially important to adapt the professional profile on the basis of the experiences actually made in practice. Although developed with reference to general education, these approaches are insufficiently advanced and elaborated with regard to the system of teacher training.

I shall designate some characteristics of this model:

- The system of in-service teacher training and the improvement of teachers' professional skills does not underline a one-sided training structure, but promotes cultural learning and developing an educational environment of social partnership and cooperation, communication and dialogue in order to create an atmosphere of mutual enrichment.
- 2. It is a system that focuses on both, the content and structural form of education.
- 3. It provides opportunities to enrol for such programmes for teachers at various levels of initial competence and addresses job-related difficulties. The system takes into account the overall variety of individual desires and needs of teachers and seeks to further the teachers' progress to a new, advanced, level of competence.
- 4. The system is open to cultural and social interaction, which are ne-



The model of cultural learning and developing an educational environment is based on the conceptual approaches by L. S. Vygotsky and S. Y. Rubinshtein. It is also founded on a variety of strategies promoting the development of personal education. The author with former Austrian representative of KulturKontakt, Erika Pratschner, the Russian mentor of the first project, Vladimir Batsin, and the editor at a preparatory meeting at Herzen State pedagogical University, St Petersburg, November 1998. Foto by Alois Ecker cessary prerequisites for general cultural and personal development.

 It is only in an advanced environment and culture of information that easy and rapid access to various sources of historical education and information technologies can be readily provided. The variety of possibilities and strategies of translating this model into practice does not permit its reduction to a strict, general, theoretical scheme, which is precisely the reason why this model is frequently perceived as a set of principles, larations and idealised perspectives. One could, however, also evaluate and view it as proof for the nonlinearity of most educational forms and structures.

Tab	le 1: Models of tea	acher training:			
No.	model of education	<i>Object and pur- pose of changes?</i>	Conceptual orien- tation	Specificity of edu- cational methodology	Institutional level
1.	Traditional model.	Subject-methodological knowledge of the teacher.	Pedagogical rationality.	Traditional didactics.	Any level (school, secondary school, higher education, improvement of professional skills).
2.	Model of organi- zational develop- ment.	School organisation.	Social–psychological theories pertaining to organisational develop- ment.	Socialpsychological methods and strategies.	On the basis of school level with expert participation.
3.	Model of process-	Professional competen-	Social psychology,	Process-oriented	Secondary schools and higher
	oriented didactics of history.	ces of the teacher.	personal and organi- sational development.	didactics.	education
4.	Model of cultural	Greater scope for socio-	Socio-cultural approach	Contextual methods	System of in-service training and
	learning and deve- loping an educa- tional environ- ment.	cultural cooperation, as a prerequisite for the teacher's development.		and strategies.	improvement of professional skills.

Initial and in-service history teacher training in practice require the development of various different approaches. The variety of ways of conceptual and practical approach is the necessary prerequisite for the formation and realisation of a strategy of democratic development, which guarantees an openness of prospects and options.

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Alexander Shevyrev

The History Textbooks in Contemporary Russia: A New Generation

The business of educational publishing in Russia experiences a real boom at the moment. Even though the number of publishing houses issuing literature for secondary school has recently dropped as a result of competition, the market of educational literature now attracts several big publishing houses, which have previously specialised in fiction and other sorts of popular literature. This market is indeed infinite in Russia: one might well speak of millions of copies. For this reason the Federal Expert Council on history is overloaded with textbook manuscripts that have been turned in and applied for recommendations by the Ministry of Education to be used in school.

The market of educational literature comprises at least three segments. First, there is a programme of educational publishing funded by the federal government. The aim of this programme is to provide free textbooks for acquisition in school libraries. This state programme develops within the framework of the Federal List of Textbooks. It is drawn up by the Ministry of Education on the basis of recommendations of the Federal Expert Council. Thus, the selection of books to be funded by state investments lies in the competence of the Ministry. The state, however, is currently incapable of ensuring the realisation of this programme because of grave financial difficulties. The inclusion alone of any textbook in the Federal List, therefore, does not guarantee state investment.

A more significant segment of the market comes from regional demands and most of these books are purchased with money from regional budgets. Each region draws up a list of textbooks and estimates how many exemplars they need for free acquisition in school libraries. The criteria of the selection of books for regional requirements tend to be rather different: they range from the subjective choice by local authorities to the analysis of teachers' demands. This segment is, perhaps, the most important for the publishing houses, which produce educational literature.

Eventually, the third segment of the market consists of the free sale of textbooks. This segment is determined, at first, by the schools' capability of obtaining money for textbooks, buying their independence of federal or regional authorities. Many schools are compelled, however, to buy the textbooks because of the scarcity not only of the federal but also of regional budgets, which cannot ensure the free acquisition of textbooks in schools. The financial burden of providing the students with the textbooks is shifted on their parents' shoulders in such cases. As a result, some teachers have the opportunity freely to choose those textbooks, which correspond to their own tastes and didactical aims. Their choice, however, is essentially influenced by the prices of textbooks.

Thus, it is possible to state that a teacher today effectively enjoys the right to choose for his or her students those textbooks that are appropriate for accomplishing the aims of teaching. The realisation of this right, however, is restricted by financial limitations for the majority of schools, by the frameworks of the Federal Programme of Educational Publishing or the lists of the textbooks funded from regional budgets, and also by way of preselection and competition, methods employed by some publishing houses or even textbook authors; it happens that history teachers are compelled for instance to use a certain textbook, which is recommended by a local or regional teacher training institute.

Overcoming the monopolistic standing of one textbook, a characteristic of Soviet times, has stimulated the development of history textbooks and produced great variety in their contents, methodology and didactics. This provides the foundation for considering modern textbooks as textbooks belonging to the new generation. Instead of the former rigid Marxist scheme the reader will find different ways of interpreting history.

Nevertheless, adherence to scheme still remains from the heritage of the old school. Only a few textbook authors deliberately avoid structuring their texts in accordance with the definite academic methodology. In the majority of the textbooks the worn-out Marxist clothes were changed for the modern cut of the so called "civilisation approach".

When in the beginning of the 90-ties the Ministry of Education and the publishing houses sought to find authors for the new generation of textbooks, they looked at the universities and academic institutes, since their main concern was to come up with an alternative to the Marxist methodology. It was supposed that such an alternative existed and that it was possible to present history as a whole as harmoniously as in previous years in the textbooks, but without leaning on Marxist terminology. One of the publishers then criticized a certain author of a textbook, for the division of the history of the Russian opposition in the 19th century into three periods. The publisher didn't explain what exactly the error of this division was, but everyone could guess what this critic alluded to: Vladimir Lenin had made the same division into three periods. The coincidence of this textbook author's interpretation with Lenin's was considered as criminal as the deviation from it in previous years.

Academics have partly justified these hopes. Instead of the boring 'social and economic structures' one could find more euphonious 'civilisations' in new teaching materials, but very often they were no more than a disguise, as "under fashionable make-up one can easily guess the painfully familiar features of bases and superstructures, social revolutions and productive forces" (Boitsev 1999:36). The paradigm of the possibility to learn to under-

stand world history as a whole and a string of integrated processes still dominates in the mentality of the academics in Russia. By Mikhail Boitsov's ironic remark, owing to more than half a century of domination by official Marxism, "the most essential part of the European 19th century - its historical consciousness" was preserved here and "we became, eventually, almost the only country where at the end of 20th century historical science still exists" (Boitsov 1999:31). Partly because of this, partly due to the traditions of the dogma of teaching, history at school still remains the learning of world-historical processes.

The other feature, which brings about that the overwhelming majority of the modern textbooks relate to the books of the previous generation has in common with those the recognition of the textbook as an exclusive and authoritative source of factual and conceptual knowledge. As a rule, all other teaching materials, such as collections of sources, work books and tests serve as an addition to the textbooks and are aimed mainly at promoting learning facts.

In effect, many authors consider it their task to give students an opportunity to comprehend history in precisely the same manner as they comprehend it themselves. As was correctly pointed out in a review, "the authors of some textbooks are convinced that they give not only one of the interpretations of history, but a correct interpretation" (Golovatenko 1997:4). This conviction reflects the preserved belief in the possibility of finding the only true concept of humanities knowledge, in general, and of history, in particular. Although modern historiography is neither capable of providing the sole nor the whole concept of universal history, this circumstance is not taken into consideration.

Another feature that is characteristic of many textbooks of the new generation is the increase of facts. Introducing more and more new facts into school curricula, ploughing up more and more new fields of historical knowledge, the authors are not inclined to neglect the wellcultivated fields and abandon the stocks, which had been the basis of their own education. Overloading with facts "becomes more and more a characteristic sign of the new textbooks – informative redundancy of the text" (Vyazemsky 1997:54).

This "factocentrism" became even more obvious with the transition to the concentric system of secondary education. Textbooks for the second stage (10-11 grades) primarily differ from textbooks for the first stage (5-9 grades) by the amount of facts. It is rather often that the authors of the programmes and textbooks see the didactical aim of the second stage as mastering knowledge acquired by students at the first stage of studying history. One might even suspect that the authors of the teaching materials, while selecting their facts, ask themselves the question "What may a student not know?" rather than "What must he know?"

The aspiration to fill the textbooks with as large a quantity of facts as possible is conditioned by the traditional belief in the power of knowledge, in one's capability of mastering its limitless sum. This conviction became even stronger due to the freedom of censorship in the selection of facts, and this freedom leads to the belief in the objectivity of a fact and, respectively, in the possibility of the objective presentation of history based solely on facts.

Another reason for raising the concentration of facts in textbooks are the standards of entrance examinations at universities. The competition for entry to the prestigious universities has became more intense over the past few years, and history is one of the subjects of entrance examinations for several humanities studies. The guarantee of success in this competition is the quantity of historical knowledge. In selecting the best applicants of the bunch

an examiner needs, guite evidently, to eliminate the worse candidates, and the applicant's wrong answer to the questions "who?" "where?", and "when?" guarantees him or her a bad mark. The system of preparation for the entrance exams is based, therefore, on learning as large an amount of knowledge as is possible, and the system of conducting examinations - on formulating such questions, which might lay bare the gaps in this abundance of facts. This reason already suffices to understand why the programme of the entrance examinations aims at increasing the demanded volume of knowledge and at widening the gap to the average capabilities of school history teaching.

In this competition with universities school evidently finds itself in a losing position. All its attempts to meet the requirements of universities are parried by the complicating of questions and the increase of the volume of demanded knowledge. The system, thus, resembles an arms race, a competition between armour and artillery.

Thus, one has to admit that the majority of the textbooks of the new generation differ, in fact, from their predecessors mostly in their contents rather than in didactical respect. One can also see new tendencies, however, towards changing the aims of history education and the role of teaching materials. An evident proof thereof is the popularity of workbooks as a new genre of educational literature. As a rule, they are used as supplementary means designed to enhance the learning of textbook stuff. The perception of them as materials with quite self-contained objects, aimed at the development of particular skills, becomes more and more widespread (for the typology of the working books, see Vyazemsky 1997:59-63). Work books such as those developed by Yury Troitsky and his colleagues as documentary-research sets, are designed to contain the influence of the textbook as an authoritative source of knowledge. For Yuri Troitsky (1999:6) «it became apparent that the paradigm ... which one could call a classical deterministic textbook system is exhausted».

Another indication of the developments in educational literature is the inclusion of sources with a developed system of assignments based on the textbooks. The pioneers of such design were Natalia Trukhina (1993), Mikhail Boitsov and Rustam Shukurov (1994). In their textbooks the additional materials were not restricted to a supplementary role or to illustrating the author's text, but became the freestanding sources of information and the subject for textual analysis. The dialogue genre of teaching materials is also developing. Its pioneer is Igor Dolutsky, who introduced this idea during the *Perestroyka* times in a poorly published brochure (Dolutsky 1989) but has since then revised it in better-designed textbooks (Dolutsky 1994ff). Following Dolutsky's example, in many textbooks the dialogue to a varying degree became a part of the text.

Another type of teaching materials are books made in association with Western technology. These materials have been developed within the framework of the "Uroki Klio" project by Russian authors, in cooperation with experts from Austria, Denmark, Holland and Scotland (Boitsev/Khromova 1999; Kushnereva/Chernikova 1999; Saplina/Sorokin/Ukolova 2000). In these books the narrative retains a fair balance between the actual text, sources and illustrations, and includes a system of assignments aimed at organising the students' work on the historical text. Although the amount of information presented in these materials tends to be greater than in similar Western books, they are being used by the teachers, and by the authors themselves as additional materials to other textbooks.

The problem of the development of a truly new generation of history textbooks derives, in my view, from another, more complex, problem, which stems from *the aims of history education*.

In the current social and cultural situation education becomes an increasingly individual rather than state or public issue, while history correspondingly turns into a means of personal, rather than social identification. The attention of school to the personality of each student requires changes in the aims of history education. The infinite accumulation of knowledge such as dates, names and facts together with the academic comprehension of the nature and meaning of historical processes cannot solve the problem of developing historical thinking and of each student's interest in history. To be relevant and useful for a student, history should, first of all, be interesting.

This idea in itself is quite banal. School, however, as a rule, separates the serious problems from the fun potential of history. The latter is usually subordinated to the former. School is supposed to give its pupils heavy baggage in terms of knowledge to meet the intellectual depth of the aims of history education and the strict requirements of academic science.

In reality "the dry residuum" of the average student's knowledge is determined just by what was interesting in history lessons. The same "dry residuum" is alienated by modern culture. Here, historical facts are reproduced in different genres and at different levels – from the elite down to elementary kitsch. The problem of the selection of contents for the history curriculum can, therefore, be reduced to taking those signs and symbols that live in the language of modern culture.

The other problem linked with the change in the aims of history education is that the intellectual skills, which are developed in traditional schools and related mainly to the reproduction of factual knowledge, rather than to the analysis of texts, are insufficient for school-leavers today. These skills form a good basis for intellectual development at university, but they do not allow the independent study of history or help resolve personal and social problems.

In modern society a person increasingly finds him or herself in a situation of being able to make a choice, rather than having to face the necessity of following a definite imperative. History in the modern school, therefore, has the task of equipping each citizen with the intellectual capacities for resolving those difficult problems of choice that are encountered in everyday life. The development of intellectual self-dependence has become the topical, rather than theoretical problem, as it has previously been, when no claims were laid to selfdependence.

Besides, modern society has become increasingly diversified. Interests, modi vivendi, cultural and consumer standards and perceptive stereotypes not only differ more and more in social, ethnic, confessional

or other identification, but often also come into conflict with each other. The aims of stabilisation and maintenance of stability within society require a distinct comprehension of both, these differences and conflicts. The nature of conflict settlements will very much depend on the citizens' abilities to understand the natural character of society's diversification. These abilities not only include the acknowledgement of different views and the understanding of "others" but also the assumption of the validity and even correctness of opposite interests and points of view.

History is one of the most effective vehicles of the formation of notions about the diversified world. It permits, courtesy of its temporal remoteness, to reflect on another modus vivendi and at the same time easily awakens, due to its reality, the feeling of empathy. The dialogue of real history needs to be reproduced in history lessons.

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European Standing Conference of History Teachers' Associations

Conférence Permanente Européenne des Associations de Professeurs d'Histoire

UROKI KLIO, EUROCLIO Project on the Development and Implementation of History Textbooks in Russia, financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign affairs, MATRA programme, 1997–2000



Background

After the changes, Russia had to rediscover the past. Academic historians are reinterpreting the Russian history, but their interpretations are regularly changing due to their political point of view. It will take some time before the Russian historians will have the academic distance necessary for an approach as objective as possible in their quest for the historical truth. History teachers in schools cannot wait until the academic historians are ready. In their classrooms young people are sitting, who experience a present, which is very different from the childhood of their parents although this childhood is only thirty years ago.

History educators in Russia also follow the switch from teaching to learning in education. The initial social movement for change has diminished considerably during the last years, but teachers are still looking for opportunities to make their lessons more effective and attractive. Russia has a long tradition in teaching history for learning as many facts as possible. Knowing the facts from the past however is not the only aim of the learning and teaching history. The modern approach in history education requires pupils' understanding of the past, empathy, attitudes and skills. An approach, which enables them to think critically, develops democratic practise and forms their own judgements and opinions.

The Project

There are four phases in the project. In the first stage of the project innovative textbooks for secondary education on post war history were written. This process took 24 months, as the textbooks should contain not only a written text but also a large variety of new source materials from Russia and abroad. Experts from other regions in Russia, the Baltic States, Austria, Denmark, The Netherlands and Scotland were invited in working sessions to implement innovative approaches, new materials and different perspectives and interpretations.

The three books focus on Russian history but with a European and world dimension. The titles of the books are *Post World War II, Ideas, Values and Reflections, 1945–1955, Illusion and Dissolution in the Sixties,* and *Difficult Roads to Democracy.* In the last book a comparison is made between the struggle for democracy in Spain, Poland and Russia. A teacher handbook with teaching ideas and instructions accompanies the books.

The second phase started in November 1998. 1000 copies of each of the three books were available for 50 teachers from different cities in Russia to be tried out for six months in classrooms. The teachers were trained by the Russian authors and foreign consultants to use the books in an active learner's approach. After this period the teachers were invited to give their feedback in a seminar.

The third phase started in December 1999, and focused on the implementation phase of the project. Teacher in-service training on the materials has taken place in eleven cities throughout European Russia and even beyond. From December 1999 – October 2000 seminars were held in Moscow, Pskov, Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, Izhevsk, Archangelsk, Wologda, St Petersburg, Petrozavodsk and Tomsk

The seminars mostly consist of workshops in small groups. Their authors present the new books. The experts from other European countries demonstrate new teaching approaches and assessment techniques. The seminars are based on active learning methods. They are consistently practising what they are promoting: active learning, learning by doing, group work, combination of visual and oral information and different approaches in the same lesson.

The seminars have provoked intense debates on history education. In each seminar there were at least 40 participants from the cities and the regions around the cities. All together about 500 teachers have been able to participate in the seminars. Each of the teachers has received permission from their school management to use the materials in their schools. Therefore each teacher received 30 copies of each book plus a teacher handbook. As a result we estimate that in 2000 and 2001 approximately 50.000 pupils will use the new textbooks in their schools.

What do our pupils need to know for their further life? This question was fundamental in developing the criteria for the selection of topics for textbooks. The questions why, what and how to teach were central to the project. The project aims to emphases the importance of these questions in the debate on future textbooks in Russia. Therefore, the last phase of this project will be a seminar devoted to textbook writing. A range of academic historians who are mostly responsible for textbook writing in Russia are invited to participate in this event, which takes place near Moscow in early December 2000.

Evaluation

The results of the try out period were investigated through questionnaires. Every teacher who used the textbooks in his/her lessons was asked to fill out these questionnaires, which contained questions about different aspects of the books and their effect on education. The results were collected, analysed and used to improve the final versions of the books. The history teachers judged the books as good to very good. The books responded to many of their wishes for new educational materials. It appeared that also a majority of the students liked the books and, very interestingly, quite some parents reacted on the materials, both positively and negatively. The outcomes of the questionnaires also showed that the new materials do not shorten the preparation time for lessons. On the contrary, to get adapted to new materials and teaching approaches is a time-consuming process.

The teachers gave many suggestions to the authors how to further improve the books. The authors have included this feedback in their writing. Many changes were made in the content, questions and task and the layout of the final versions of the three books.

All seminars are also evaluated through questionnaires. All participants are requested to send in a second questionnaire half a year after they have used the materials in classroom. The results will be published in the final report of the project.

Network

The eleven in-service teacher-training seminars in different parts of Russia also have created a network of innovative initial and in-service teacher trainer institutes. The universities, pedagogical universities and in-service training institutes in these cities have been actively involved in the organisation of the seminars. The educational authorities of Moscow have officially approved the books for classroom practice in the Moscow region. In Novgorod, Argankelsk, Pskov the local organisation of the seminars have formed the nucleus of a new History Teachers Associations, which will take part in Russian- and Europe-wide networks of history teachers.

Linkage to New Ways to the Past, The Baltic EUROCLIO Project

The relations between the Uroki Klio Project and the similar MATRA project New Ways to the Past in Estonia

and Latvia have been very important for both projects. The projects are comparable but slightly different. There appeared to be little knowledge about the present situation in the neighbouring countries. A shared past but a different present provides an interesting basis for working together. The Russian school textbooks are officially allowed by the educational authorities in Estonia and Latvia to be used as resource material in Russian speaking schools. The teacher handbook in Russian language, developed in the Baltic Project, already finds its way among Russian history educators.

Russian Participation in International Events related to Learning and Teaching of History

The project allowed the Russian authors participating in international study visits, seminars, congresses and conferences. They could share their experiences and were inspired by ideas of colleagues from almost every European country.

General Problems

The year 1998 was especially complicated for financial reasons, as in August 1998 the Ruble lost more than 300% of its value. 1999 was complicated for political reasons. The war in Kosovo aroused strong anti-Western sentiments in Russia. This, however did, not damage the good co-operation. Notwithstanding the emotions, the atmosphere did not change towards hostility. It could be that such an attitude is due to the ideas behind the project, which support pluralism and tolerance. It was clear, however, that as a result of the Kosovo crisis and the Chechnyan war, some of the Russian authors and teachers moved to a more patriotic and national point of view.

Language

The teacher training seminars always take place with the help of an interpreter. It is a disappointment to see how little command highly educated people in Russia – all history teachers have a University degree – have only a single foreign language. At least 80% of them only speak Russian. No English, no German, no French, and no other language. It is a severe limitation in communication and in understanding the rest of the world.

Final Report

To finish the project a final publication will be made with contributions from several participants to the project, co-ordinators, authors, experts and teachers, to the form of small articles. It will comprise an overview of the project, its evaluation and details on several of its aspects in a way that it can be used as a transferable model for similar projects. The report will be available in May 2001.

Contributions

Local authorities and school principles supported the project by providing hotel accommodations, means of transport, the dissemination of materials, organising extra meetings and support with the foundation of new History Teachers Associations. School principals allowed their teachers to leave school for many days or weeks to work for the project or to participate in in-service activities.

Kultur Kontakt Austria from Vien-

na, paid for the travel and subsistence costs of the Austrian expert in the project and for extra teachers to participate in the seminars in the North West region. Bureau CROSS from the Netherlands, which is engaged in educational policy in Russia, has covered the costs of the seminar in Tomsk.

The Körber Foundation, British Council and the Soros Open Society Foundation contributed to the travel and stay of Russian authors attending international events related to earning and teaching of history. The British Council in Moscow financed language courses in English for the projects' participants.



Kremlin of Kazan in the background of river Kazanka. Foto: Dragoljub Zamurovic, in: Kazan. The Enchanted capital, Flint River Press Ltd., London 1995, p. 25

Educational Cooperation Austria-Russia

Currently, ten official representatives for educational affairs are working on behalf of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of the Republic of Austria in Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Russia, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary). These representatives cooperate with and are supported in their activities by the Association Kultur Kontakt Austria. Kultur Kontakt Austria was founded in 1989 and promotes cultural and artistic projects in the Eastern European reform states on the one hand and bilateral and multilateral educational projects with these states on the other so as to foster neighbourly cooperation and further the building of a common European educational and cultural area. As for the field of education, the main emphasis lies on providing support to reform-oriented measures at school level, which are geared towards building and establishing structures. This begins with the development of curricula and teaching aids and educational standards, also comprises teacher training courses ("train the trainer") and the support of school management and administration reforms, and goes as far as drawing up topical programmes in the field of vocational training, democratic citizenship, historical didactics and ecology.

An essential factor in this educational cooperation remains international cooperation. The official Austrian representative for educational affairs in Russia, Hans Schustereder, works in St Petersburg, where Kultur Kontakt takes part in the Centre for Educational Innovation at A. I. Herzen Pedagogical University. The partners in this centre are Russia, the Netherlands, Austria, the Flemish Community of Belgium and the British Council. This centre, which was founded in 1994 on the initiative of Russia and the Netherlands, conducts bilateral and multilateral educational projects in the form of seminar cycles, separate seminars and workshops. Participants in the projects include representatives from teacher training and further teacher education institutions, local, regional and national educational administrations as well as Russian experts. The objective is to accomplish the multiplication of the results gained from the educational projects, in particular in the northwestern region of Russia. Furthermore, the Centre for Educational Innovation aspires to foster interaction and networking among Russian educational establishments. The cooperation with international organisations such as the Council of Europe, UNESCO and the European Centre for Foreign Languages in Graz becomes increasingly important. What is more, in the near future the Centre for Educational Innovation is expected to be enhanced in standing and transformed into an *Institute*.

The main stress of the activities at the Centre for Educational Innovation has thus far been put on the methodology and didactics in history teaching, motivation in science teaching, political education, educational management, school development as well as environmen-

tal instruction. A seminar cycle on the subject "Motivation in Science *Teaching*" is currently held with participants from Jaroslavl and St Petersburg. Together with Dutch and Austrian experts strategies are worked out which help stimulate and increase pupils' motivation and their interest in science lessons. The seminar "Civil Education" is designed to further political and legal awareness and the crystallisation of a Civil Society. Within the framework of a TACIS/PCP project in cooperation with the Educational Committee of the City of St Petersburg Austrian and Dutch experts introduce participants from ten St Petersburg schools to the building of training firms.

In the field of history various projects, seminars and courses have thus far been held. This year Kultur Kontakt has supported three seminars, two of which were conducted by EUROCLIO (European Standing Conference of History Teachers' Associations) as in-service teacher training seminars. The first took place in February in Novgorod, the second in September in Vologda. In several workshops subjects were addressed such as Problems in History Education in Modern Russia, Difficult Roads to Democracy, Using Source Materials, Assessment. In April Kultur Kontakt supported the participation of a group of ten in the seminar New History Textbooks for Secondary Schools: New Approaches to their Preparation and Evaluation. A British, a Norwegian and an Austrian specialist could be won as speakers. The three workshops, which were held under the guidance of the Western experts, were devoted to the topics New History Textbooks for Secondary Schools, The Evaluation of History Textbooks for Secondary Schools and New Methods in the Preparation of New History Textbooks.

These various seminars, courses and workshops are by no means only about the one-sided transfer of knowledge from West to East. The Western experts take with them plenty of experience and insights from the participants.

In the course of an International Conference on Innovative Strategies for the Development of the European Educational Community (2.-3.6.2000) new perspectives and ways of working at the International Centre for Educational Innovation have been suggested and discussed. Apart from the representatives of the ministries of education of Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain and Finland participants also included World Bank officials and the two Russian Vice Education Ministers Victor A. Bolotov and Alexander M. Kondakov. A further conference, Leadership in Education, is scheduled for February 2001.

A number of projects and activities is conducted separately by the official Austrian representative.

Among these are seminars and courses on teacher training for German teachers in St Petersburg and the northwestern region of Russia. The objective is to support German teachers at schools and universities, on the one hand in training and broadening their linguistic abilities, but on the other hand geographical, historical and cultural aspects of Austria should also be imparted. These programmes are also held in cooperation with the Austrian lecturers for German at the local St Petersburg universities. Activities relating to establishing contacts between Russian and Austrian educational institutions in view of a mutual exchange of experiences have recently greatly gained in importance. Another responsibility of the official Austrian representative is the building of a library for German teachers and students (opening hours:

Monday to Friday daily from 1000 to 1800), which – unlike the Austria Library at State University – focuses on German textbooks and works of reference on Austria. Owing to the limited budgetary capacity, however, the library largely has to rely on contributions on the part of Austrian bookshops for expansion.

Teacher exchange programmes, which are financed and supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of the Republic of Austria, also have to be organised. Each summer ten Russian teachers from Austria visit St Petersburg and attend four-week training courses in Russian, while ten German teachers from St Petersburg, in turn, brush up their knowledge in Austria.

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The "Verein fЯr Geschichte und Sozialkunde" ("Association for History and Social Studies") is an academic organization primarily devoted to activities of research and publication in the field of history and social studies. The journal *BeitrKge zur historischen Sozialkunde* has been published since 1971. It addresses mainly topics of social historical research and concentrates on introducing issues of social studies in school history education. Over the 29 years of the journal's existence we have achieved a remarkable collection of publications in social and economic history.

Since 1992, the Association has also published a series of academic books. This series is called *Historische Sozialkunde/Internationale Entwicklung* and will soon include eighteen volumes. These textbooks have different aims. Firstly, to offer easy and readable basic information, secondly, to provide survey studies, and thirdly, to cover controversially debated issues for a wide reading public interested in historical and social studies.

In 1998 we took up the production of a further series of books under the title *Querschnitte*. EinfЯhrungstexte zur Sozial-, Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte. This series concentrates on European topics. The volumes which have been published until now dealed with the revolutionary year 1848 in a European context, the history of the European expansion, the history of sexology, and the history of the world trade since 1500.

The publication activities of the Association are completed by a third series of books. In spring 1999, the first book of essays based on an explicitly regional approach – in this case East Asia – was published. A title on Africa followed in 2000.

In addition, the Association engages in smaller research projects, including social history, training in social history, the organization of workshops and the collection of classroom-oriented materials for teachers.

The work of the Association is attracting wide support, from home and abroad. A number of internationally well-known researchers in the field of history and of neighbouring disciplines can be found among the list of authors and subscribers of our publications.

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